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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATE ACTION-YEO V. TOWN OF 
LEXINGTON: High School Student Editors as State Actors 
Even were we to adopt such [a flexible] approach . . . [to state 
action by keying it to the offensiveness of the constitutional com­
plaint,] we would be inclined to group infringements of funda­
mental rights and racial discrimination together ... just as they 
receive comparable scrutiny in equal protection cases.1 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States Constitution restricts only conduct by the 
state or federal government, not conduct by private individuals.2 
Constitutional guarantees, in other words, protect individuals only 
from "state action,"3 not from private action. Thus, before a court 
1. Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1, 6 n.5 (1st Cir. 1978). 
2. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution reads in rele­
vant part: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). Since its enactment, the United States 
Supreme Court has interpreted this Amendment as outlining "the essential dichotomy 
set forth in that Amendment between deprivation by the State, subject to scrutiny 
under its provisions, and private conduct, 'however discriminatory or wrongful,' against 
which the Fourteenth Amendment offers no shield." Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison 
Co.,A19 U.S. 345, 349 (1974) (citing Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883». In the 
Civil Rights Cases, the Supreme Court wrote the following: 
[Clivil rights, such as are guaranteed by the Constitution against State aggres­
sion, cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals, unsupported by 
State authority in the shape of laws, customs, or judicial or executive proceed­
ings. The wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by any such authority, is 
simply a private wrong .... 
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 17. There are two exceptions to this rule about state 
action: the Thirteenth Amendment and certain privileges afforded United States citi­
zens. For further discussion, see infra note 14. 
3. It is probably clearer just to say "government action" since the requirement 
applies to federal, state, and local governments. However, to avoid confusion with the 
language of the cases, this Note will use the expression "state action" throughout. 
The phrase "state action" is a misnomer because the issue arises in an identical 
manner when the federal government or its agents are involved in a case .... 
[AlII problems relating to the existence of government action-local, state, fed­
eral-which would subject an individual to constitutional restrictions come 
under the heading of "state action." 
183 
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can determine whether a private citizen's constitutional right has 
been violated, it must first determine whether the state was respon­
sible for the challenged action. 
Typically, courts do not have trouble finding state action when 
the state or a particular state official causes the alleged constitu­
tional violation. Finding state action is more difficult, however, 
when a private individual allegedly violates a constitutional right, 
and the aggrieved party attempts to characterize the wrongdoer as a 
state actor. If the aggrieved party can convince a court that the 
private wrongdoer's action may be fairly attributed to the state, 
then the court will find state action and analyze the merits of the 
constitutional challenge. But if no state action is found, the court 
will dismiss the constitutional challenge and never hear the merits 
of the case. 
In Yeo v. Town of Lexington,4 Douglas Yeo, a town resident, 
parent, and founder of Lexington Parents Information Network 
("LEXNET"), submitted an advertisement to two Lexington High 
School ("LHS") publications, the LHS Yearbook, and the LHS 
Musket-a student newspaper.5 Both publications refused to run 
his ad.6 Yeo filed suit on the ground that this refusal violated his 
First Amendment right to free speech.7 The United States Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit held, however, that no First Amend-
JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12.1, at 470-71 
(5th ed. 1995). Moreover, "the requirement may be satisfied by action of counties, 
municipalities, and other local government entities such as special districts. All such 
branches of local government are considered agencies of the State." Russell W. Gallo­
way, The Government-Action Requirement in American Constitutional Law, 30 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 935, 935 n.6 (1990); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI­
TUTIONAL LAW § 18-1, at 1688 n.2 (2d ed. 1988) ("[T]he words 'state action' will denote 
action by any level of government, from local to national."). 
4. 131 F.3d 241 (1st Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2060 (1998). 
5. 	 The advertisement read as follows: 

We know you can do it! 

ABSTINENCE: The Healthy Choice 

Sponsored by: Lexington Parents InfornIation Network (LEXNET) 

Post Office Box 513, Lexington Massachusetts 02173. 

[d. at 244. See infra Part II.A for further discussion of the facts of Yeo. 
6. See Yeo, 131 F.3d at 247. 
7. See id. at 248. The First Amendment provides, in relevant part: "Congress 
shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech ...." U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
Specifically, Yeo alleged a civil rights violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which 
reads, in pertinent part: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within 
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni­
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ment violation occurred because the decision to reject the ad did 
not constitute state action.8 The court found that high school stu­
dent editors, acting independently, made the decision, and that the 
students' decision could not be fairly attributed to any school offi­
ciaL9 As a result, the case was dismissed.lO 
This Note examines Yeo in an effort to determine whether, 
under the facts of Yeo, independent actions of public high school 
students may constitute state action. Part I provides an introduc­
tion to the state action doctrine, paying particular attention to its 
current formulations and its application to high school free speech 
cases. Part II presents the principal case of Yeo v. Town of Lexing­
ton. This Part presents the relevant facts of Yeo, and traces and 
explains the court's reasoning from the district court level to the en 
banc decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit. 
Part III critically evaluates the First Circuit's majority opinion 
in Yeo. First, this Part suggests that the First Circuit's majority 
opinion used a heightened standard for finding state action, a se­
quential approach,u instead of a more liberal standard, the totality 
approach,12 because the court assumed that state action standards 
should vary with the offensiveness of the constitutional claim at 
ties secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in 

an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress .... 

42 U.S.c. § 1983 (Supp. II 1996) (emphasis added); see also Yeo, 131 F.3d at 248. As a 

general rule, the "under color [of law)" requirement of § 1983 is "treated as the same 

thing as the 'state action' required under the Fourteenth Amendment." United States 

v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966); see also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 
922,935 n.18 (1982) (overturning an appellate court which treated the under color and 
state action analyses as separate, and finding "the under color-of-state-law requirement 
does not add anything not already included within the requirement of the Fourteenth 
Amendment"); Barrios-Velazquez v. Asociacion de Empleados, 84 F.3d 487, 490-91 (1st 
Cir. 1996) (treating the two analyses the same). The Yeo court followed this practice by 
treating the "under color of law" requirement of § 1983 as equivalent to the state action 
requirement. See Yeo, 131 F.3d at 248 n.3. 
8. See Yeo, 131 F.3d at 255. 
9. See id. at 253-55. 
10. The First Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the decision of the United States 
District Court for the District of Massachusetts, see Yeo v. Town of Lexington, No. 94­
10811-RGS, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7310, at *15 (D. Mass. Apr. 22, 1996), and reversed 
its prior panel decision, which had found state action and a First Amendment violation. 
See Yeo v. Town of Lexington, No. 96-1623, 1997 WL 292173, at *2 (1st Cir. June 6, 
1997), rev'd en bane, 131 F.3d 241 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2060 (1998). 
As such, the en banc decision did not address the merits of the First Amendment issue, 
with the exception of Chief Judge Torruella's concurring opinion which asserted that no 
First Amendment violation had occurred. See Yeo, 131 F.3d at 255-56. 
11. See infra Part LA.3 for a discussion of the sequential approach. 
12. See infra Part LA.2 for a discussion of the totality approach. 
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stake. Second, this Part challenges the majority's use of this height­
ened standard by examining the court's assumption that courts 
should vary state action standards according to the offensiveness of 
the constitutional violation alleged. It argues that keying state ac­
tion standards to particular constitutional rights is inappropriate be­
cause it undermines judicial accountability and fails to give equal 
consideration to all alleged fundamental rights violations. Third, 
this Part suggests that instead of varying state action standards with 
the type of constitutional right at stake, courts should use an "Equal 
Consideration Approach" for state action analysis, namely, they 
should apply the liberal state action standard to all alleged funda­
mental rights violations. Finally, this Part suggests that under the 
facts of Yeo, applying this liberal standard would support a finding 
of state action. As such, the Note concludes that state action should 
have been found in Yeo, and the case should have been decided on 
the merits. 
I. FINDING STATE ACTION 
A. The State Action Doctrine 
This section will introduce the United States Supreme Court's 
state action doctrine, its recent formulations, and its application to 
public high schools in particular,13 
In almost all constitutional cases, the plaintiff must prove that a 
state actor, or someone whose action may be fairly attributed to the 
state, deprived him of a constitutional right.14 The state action 
13. For a thorough discussion of the history of the state action doctrine, see G. 
Sidney Buchanan, A Conceptual History of the State Action Doctrine: The Search for 
Governmental Responsibility, Part I, 34 Hous. L. REv. 333 (1997), and G. Sidney 
Buchanan, A Conceptual History of the State Action Doctrine: The Search for Govern­
mental Responsibility, Part II, 34 Hous. L. REv. 665 (1997). For more general discus­
sions of the doctrine, see Barbara Rook Snyder, Private Motivation, State Action and 
the Allocation of Responsibility for Fourteenth Amendment Violations, 75 CORNELL L. 
REv. 1053,1053 n.l (1990) (providing a generous list of state action articles); Ronald J. 
Krotoszynski, Jr., Back to the Briarpatch: An Argument in Favor of Constitutional Meta­
Analysis in State Action Determinations, 94 MICH. L. REv. 302 (1995); NOWAK & Ro­
TUNDA, supra note 3, at § 12; 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE 
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 16 (2d ed. 1992); TRIBE, 
supra note 3, at § 18; Galloway, supra note 3; Michael J. Phillips, The Inevitable Inco­
herence ofModern State Action Doctrine, 28 ST. LoUIS U. L.J. 683 (1984); and Dilan A. 
Esper, Note, Some Thoughts on the Puzzle of State Action, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 663 
(1995). 
14. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978) ("[M]ost rights se­
cured by the Constitution are protected only against infringement by governments."); 
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974) (stating that the Court has 
affirmed "the essential dichotomy set forth in [the Fourteenth] Amendment between 
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question requires little analysis when a state official engaged in the 
challenged conduct. Typically, when a state official caused the con­
stitutional infringement, state action is presumed.15 
Finding state action is more difficult where a private individual 
caused the alleged constitutional violation.16 Recently, the United 
States Supreme Court stated that a court should make two inquiries 
in determining whether state action is present in such casesP First, 
a court should ask "whether the claimed constitutional deprivation 
resulted from the exercise of some right or privilege having its 
source in state authority."18 Under this inquiry, a court must deter­
mine whether the state provided the means, vis-a-vis a state created 
deprivation by the State, subject to scrutiny under its provisions, and private conduct, 
'however discriminatory or wrongful,' against which the Fourteenth Amendment offers 
no shield"); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883) (striking down the Civil Rights Act 
of 1875 as unconstitutional since the Fourteenth Amendment, which Congress relied on 
to enforce the Act's prohibition against discrimination in public accommodations, only 
reaches state and not private action). 
There are two exceptions to the state action requirement. The first involves the 
Thirteenth Amendment, which applies to both state and private action. A person 
claiming he has been subject to slavery or involuntary servitude need not prove state 
action. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 436 (1968) (finding discrimina­
tion by private real estate developer violated the 1866 Civil Rights Act because the 
drafters intended the Act to apply to both private and public discriminatory acts since 
that purpose is rationally related to eradicating slavery or its badges or incidents pursu­
ant to the Thirteenth Amendment). The second exception involves certain privileges 
afforded to United States citizens, such as the use of the public roads for interstate 
travel. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 765 (1966) (upholding an application 
of the criminal conspiracy provision of the Civil Rights Act to private individuals who 
attempted to deprive black persons of the right to enjoy public facilities connected with 
interstate travel). 
15. See 1 SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CiVIL RIGHTS AND CiVIL LmERTIES LfTIGA­
TION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 § 2.04, at 62 (3d ed. 1991) ("The easy cases in which 
to find state action are those where a state employee acting on behalf of the state pursu­
ant to state authority thereby brings about plaintiffs constitutional deprivation."). 
However, the presumption will not hold where the government official is not acting in 
his or her official capacity, or is performing an independent function that is in the con­
text considered private. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 324-25 (1981) (find­
ing that a public defender was not a state actor when she was representing a criminal 
defendant, even though she was considered a state actor when performing other duties, 
such as when making hiring decisions). 
16. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) (finding no state action when 
nursing home administrators, using independent medical judgment, decided to dis­
charge or transfer patients without adequate procedures, even though the nursing home 
received substantial federal funding and was extensively regulated); Rendell-Baker v. 
Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840 (1982) (finding no state action when a private school, acting 
independently, decided to discharge employees, even though the school received almost 
all of its funds from the state). 
17. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 618-22 (1991). 
18. Id. at 620; accord Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). 
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right, privilege, or regulation, that caused the deprivation of a con­
stitutional right.19 Thus, someone must have used the state-created 
means to deprive someone of his or her constitutional rights. 
Second, a court must also ask "whether the private party 
charged with the deprivation could be described in all fairness as a 
state actor."20 In other words, a court must determine whether the 
private person who used the state-created means to deprive another 
of his constitutional right is, for all intents and purposes, a state 
actor; that is, whether a court ought to treat such private conduct as 
if it were state conduct.21 To make that determination, the Supreme 
Court has outlined three factors: "[1] the extent to which the [pri­
vate] actor relies on governmental assistance and benefits; [2] 
whether the actor is performing a traditional governmental func­
tion; and [3] whether the injury caused is aggravated in a unique 
way by the incidents of governmental authority."22 
Courts have referred to the first and the third of these factors 
together as the "nexus" test,23 and the second factor as the "public 
function" test.24 The public function test is an independent test 
which analyzes whether the private action is of the kind tradition­
19. For example, where a state statute provides a right to garnish, or to obtain a 
prejudgment attachment, it provides the means for which a private party may deprive 
another of his or her constitutional right of due process pursuant to the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937. 
20. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 620; accord Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941-42. 
21. See NAHMOD, supra note 15, § 2.04, at 62. 
22. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 621-22 (citations omitted). 
23. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974). 
24. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461,475 (1953); see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, 
supra note 3, § 12.1, at 473; GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITU· 
TIONAL LAW 890-91 (13th ed. 1997); Krotoszynski, supra note 13, at 314. 
Besides the "public function" and the "nexus" tests, the Supreme Court has articu­
lated other tests or factors. For example, the Court has formulated the "state compul- . 
sion" test, which analyzes whether a state law compelled a private person to violate 
another's constitutional right, and the "joint action" test, which analyzes whether a state 
official helped a private person violate another's constitutional right. See Adickes v. 
S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152, 170 (1970) (finding state action when a restaurant 
used a state-enforced custom requiring racial segregation to deny service to a caucasian 
in the company of African Americans); see also Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 
149, 157 (1978) (finding no state action where private defendant engaged in true self­
help when he sold a debtor's goods in his possession). For purposes of this Note, the 
state compulsion test and the joint action test are grouped with the nexus test, since 
they involve determining the number and quality of contacts between the private party 
and the state. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 922, 939 (noting that "[w]hether these different 
tests are actually different in operation or simply different ways of characterizing the 
necessarily fact-bound inquiry that confronts the Court in such a situation need not be 
resolved here"). See infra Part 1.A.1 for further discussion of the various tests or 
factors. 
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ally exclusively reserved for the state.25 For example, in Marsh v. 
Alabama,26 the Supreme Court held that the Town of Chickasaw, a 
suburb of Mobile, Alabama and privately owned by the Gulf Ship­
building Corporation, which banned the distribution of religious 
literature, was a state actor because running a town is a power tra­
ditionally exclusively reserved to the state.27 
If a private entity fails to satisfy the public function test, a court 
may still find state action if a sufficient nexus exists between the 
private actor and the state. The next section examines how a court 
may search for a nexus between private conduct and the state.28 
1. The Nexus Test 
The nexus test is a more difficult test to apply than the public 
function test. It requires a court to examine whether "private con­
duct abridging individual rights" has involved "to some significant 
extent the State in any of its manifestations."29 In other words, a 
court must determine whether the state was somehow connected to, 
25. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966), where the Supreme Court 
found state action by private trustees of a park in light of the tradition of municipal 
control. The Court noted the following: "[W]hen private individuals or groups are en­
dowed by the State with powers or functions governmental in nature, they become 
agencies or instrumentalities of the State and subject to its constitutional limitations." 
Id. 
26. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
27. See id. at 508 (concluding that "the town of Chickasaw does not function dif­
ferently from any other town"). Marsh applies when privately owned property is the 
functional equivalent to a municipality. See Galloway, supra note 3, at 943 n.28. Cur­
rently, the Court has recognized two other types of conduct as constituting a traditional 
public function: running elections for public office, see Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 
663 (1944) (holding that a state party convention may not ban black persons from vot­
ing in primary elections); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461,472 (1953) (finding that a Dem­
ocratic party "club" was a state actor designed to evade constitutional prohibition 
against all-white primaries), and using peremptory challenges in selecting a jury, see 
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 627 (1991) (finding that a private 
litigant's race-based exercise of peremptory challenges was state action, since alleged 
deprivation implicated a traditional function of the government). But see Jackson, 419 
U.S. at 352 (running a public power company was not a traditional public function ex­
clusively reserved for the state); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507,520 (1976) (holding 
that operating privately-owned shopping centers does not constitute a "public function" 
under the state action doctrine). See generally, TRIBE, supra note 3, § 18-5; NOWAK & 
ROTUNDA, supra note 3, § 12.2. 
28. For a thorough discussion of the public function test, see Esper, supra note 13, 
at 687-708. Since the state action analysis in Yeo does not involve a public function test, 
but the nexus test, see infra Part II, the following background material focuses on the 
nexus test only. 
29. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961); see also 
Buchanan, supra note 13, at 422. 
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or had sufficient contacts with, the harm that the private actor 
caused the claimant. The Supreme Court has held that this analysis 
involves a fact bound inquiry and must be conducted on a case by 
case basis.30 Nonetheless, the Court has used a variety of factors to 
determine whether a sufficient nexus exists between the private 
person's conduct and the state.31 
a. Compelling, encouraging, and assisting 
To determine whether a nexus exits between private and state 
action, the Court has analyzed whether the state has by law, by reg­
ulation, or by participation, compelled, encouraged, or assisted the 
challenged private activity.32 For example, in Shelly v. Kraemer,33 
the Court found state action in a white private property owner's 
decision not to sell his land to an African-American purchaser be­
cause a court enforced a common law restrictive covenant on the 
land that forbade such sales.34 The Court has also found state ac­
30. See Burton, 365 U.S. at 722 ("Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances 
can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true 
significance."); see also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982) (ac­
knowledging that no bright line rule exists to determine when there are sufficient con­
nections between the state and a private actor to constitute state action). 
31. See generally TRIBE, supra note 3, § 18-7; NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 3, 
§ 12. 
32. See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) (noting that "a State 
normally can be held responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coer­
cive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that 
the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State"); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 
436 U.S. 149, 164 (1978) (noting that "[o]ur cases state 'that a State is responsible for 
the ... act of a private party when the State, by its law, has compelled the act'" (altera­
tion in original»; see also Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 839-43 (1982) (finding 
that no state action existed when a private, extensively regulated, and state funded 
school discharged employees because the state regulations in no way compelled or in­
fluenced the school's decision); Moose Lodge Number 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 177 
(1972) (finding no state action with a private social club's racially restrictive policies 
because there was no government encouragement to have these policies). 
33. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
34. See id. at 19. In Shelly, the court action began when third parties interested in 
the transaction sued the owner to stop the sale. The Supreme Court held that such 
private discrimination was state action since it flowed from a judicial command to en­
force racial discrimination, which would violate the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. 
This type of judicial encouragement of racial discrimination was also found to be state 
action when the Court struck down state imposed monetary damages against those who 
breached racially restrictive covenants because the penalty was the functional 
equivalent to encouragement. See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 250 (1953); see 
also Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153, 156-57 (1964) (holding that a private restau­
rant's racially restrictive practices constituted state action when those practices flowed 
from state regulation that required separate toilet facilities for blacks and whites). 
However, those uses of a court which implicate state action should be distinguished 
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tion where a private creditor used a court to authorize, and a sheriff 
to assist, the seizing of a debtor's property.35 Thus, the Court will 
find a sufficient nexus when the state compels, encourages, or as­
sists private persons' activities. 
b. Other contacts: regulating, benefitting, and subsidizing 
The Court has also examined the number and quality of pre­
sumably "neutral" contacts between the private actor and the state 
for finding a sufficient nexus. These contacts include extensive li­
censing and regulation of a person's activities,36 a mutual or symbi­
otic relationship between the state and the private person,37 and 
extensive or direct state subsidies to the private person or entity.38 
Although state regulation and licensing of a private activity 
from those which do not, such as using the courts to enforce trespass laws when a pri­
vate landowner refuses to permit a member of a racial minority on his land. The tres­
pass instances are presumably different because a court will not be involved in the 
private individual's decision. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 3, § 12.1, at 487; see 
also TRIBE, supra note 3, § 18-6, at 1711 (discussing common law as a subject of state 
action theory). But see ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMYTING OF AMERICA: THE POLIT­
ICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 151-53 (1990) (arguing that the Shelly Court went beyond 
its role as adjudicator of private agreements in finding that a "decision of a state court 
under common law rules constitutes the action of the state"). 
35. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941-42 (finding state action when an oil company sued 
an alleged debtor and obtained a prejudgment writ of attachment of the debtor's prop­
erty and then had the county sheriff execute the writ); see also Soldal v. Cook County, 
Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 72 (1992) (finding state action when the owner of a mobile home park 
enlisted the assistance of the county sheriff's office to remove a mobile home from the 
park by removing it from its foundation and towing it away). But see Flagg Bros., 436 
U.S. at 166 (finding no state action because the creditor engaged in true self-help when 
he sold a debtor's property, which was subject to a lien by the creditor). 
36. See Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 839-43 (examining whether a private school's 
extensive regulations transforms it into a state actor with respect to employee dis­
charges); Blum, 457 U.S. at 1003-12 (examining whether state regulations and licensing 
of a private nursing home makes it a state actor when it discharged or transferred pa­
tients without adequate procedures); Moose Lodge Number 107, 407 U.S. at 175-79 
(examining whether a private club's liquor license makes it a state actor with respect to 
the club's racial policies); CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 114-21 (1973) 
(examining whether federal regulations and licensing procedures played a role in en­
couraging a radio station's refusal to accept editorial advertising). 
37. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 723-26 (1961) (finding 
state action when a private coffee shop would not serve an African-American since the 
shop leased its premises from a government-owned parking garage and each benefitted 
from the relationship, namely, the coffee shop received extra customers because the 
government employees used the garage, and the government received rental money 
from the shop). See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text for further discussion of 
Burton. 
38. See Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, Ala., 417 U.S. 556, 568-69 (1974) (hold­
ing that a city could not grant the exclusive use of public facilities to racially segregated 
groups because that constituted a subsidy to a racially discriminatory practice). 
192 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:183 
carry weight in the state action analysis, the weight is reduced when 
the effect of the regulation or license is neutral and does not some­
how encourage the challenged activity.39 In other words, regulation 
and licensing that does not, by itself, encourage or compel the chal­
lenged activity is insufficient to find state action.40 
However, finding what the Court has termed a "symbiotic" or 
"mutual relationship" between the state and the private actor 
weighs more heavily in a state action analysis.41 For example, in 
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,42 the Court held that a 
privately owned coffee shop, which leased its space from a govern­
ment parking facility, was a state actor when it denied service to an 
African-American customer. The Court based its holding, in part, 
on the fact "that the peculiar relationship of the restaurant to the 
parking facility in which it is located confers on each an incidental 
variety of mutual benefits."43 Importantly, the Court found state 
action even though the state did not directly aid or encourage the 
private actor.44 
Another contributing factor in finding state action under the 
nexus test is the private party's use of direct or special state subsi­
dies.4s The subsidies, however, must be something more than gen­
eralized services or aid, such as fire and police protection or general 
tax exemptions.46 But the amount of the subsidy is not disposi­
39. See supra note 36 for examples of cases where no state action was found 
involving neutral regulations. 
40. See Moose Lodge Number 107, 407 U.S. at 163, 176-77, 179; see also NOWAK 
& ROTUNDA, supra note 3, § 12.4, at 495. 
41. Justice Rehnquist first used the term "symbiotic relationship" in his opinion 
in Moose Lodge Number 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175 (1972), to refer to what he 
thought was an important element in finding state action in Burton v. Wilmington Park· 
ing Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961). 
42. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). See infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text for a more 
detailed discussion of Burton. 
43. Burton, 365 U.S. at 724. The Court recognized that the restaurant benefitted 
from the convenience of the parking for its guests and the business from government 
workers. See id. Additionally, the government benefitted from the rental income, from 
its employees enjoying the convenience of a nearby restaurant, and from the increased 
demand for its parking facility. See id. 
44. See id. at 725. In fact, the Court noted that it was the state's "inaction" that 
"has not only made itself a party to the refusal of service [to blacks], but has elected to 
place its power, property and prestige behind the admitted discrimination." Id. 
45. See Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, Ala., 417 U.S. 556, 568-69 (1974). See 
infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of Gilmore. 
46. See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455,465 (1973) (noting that while a direct 
state subsidy of textbooks to private schools that discriminate on the basis of race con­
stitutes state action, other assistance not readily available independently of the state, 
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tive.47 The subsidies must be specialized and directed to a limited 
group. For example, in the case of Gilmore v. City of Montgom­
ery,48 the Supreme Court held that a city cannot give a racially seg­
regated private school exclusive use of public facilities, since that 
action would be a direct subsidy of a discriminatory practice.49 
However, the Court ostensibly acknowledged that these private 
schools may use the facilities if other groups were also permitted to 
use the facilities.50 Although the Court has not directly addressed 
whether receiving direct aid would, itself, tum private conduct into 
state action, the result in Gilmore suggests this possibility. 51 Never­
theless, the Court would probably not find state action where the 
aid was generalized and indirect.52 
2. The Totality Approach 
The Supreme Court has treated the relationship between nexus 
factors differently over the years.53 For example, it has held that to 
find state action a court should consider the nexus factors in the 
aggregate.54 As such, the Court has, in addressing state action, ana­
such as electricity, water, and police and fire protection, would not constitute state ac­
tion); see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 3, § 12.4, at 502. 
47. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840 (1982) (finding no state action 
even though in some years the state subsidized ninety-nine percent of a private school's 
tuition); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1011-12 (1982) (finding no state action even 
though a private nursing home received extensive government subsidies through the 
Medicare and Medicaid programs). 
48. 417 U.S. 556 (1974). 
49. See id. at 568-69. In Gilmore, the City of Montgomery, Alabama was permit­
ting racially segregated schools and other segregated private groups and clubs exclusive 
use of city parks and recreational facilities in the context of a 1959 parks desegregation 
order. This policy created, "in effect, 'enclaves of segregation' and deprived petitioners 
of equal access to parks and recreational facilities." Id. at 566; cf. Norwood, 413 U.S. at 
455 (striking down a program under which Mississippi loaned books to private schools 
which discriminated on the basis of race). According to the Court in Norwood, "the 
economic consequence is to give aid to the enterprise; if the school engages in discrimi­
natory practices the State by tangible aid in the form of textbooks thereby gives support 
to such discrimination." Id. at 464-65. 
50. See Gilmore, 417 U.S. at 570 & n.lO ("[W]e are unable to draw a conclusion 
as to whether the use of [public facilities] ... by private school groups in common with 
others ... involves government so directly in the actions of those users as to warrant 
court intervention on constitutional grounds."). 
51. Cf. Fortin v. Darlington Little League, Inc., 514 F.2d 344, 347 (1st Cir. 1974) 
(finding state action in a sex discrimination case where a little league organization de­
pended heavily upon city baseball diamonds). See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, 
supra note 3, § 12.4, at 502-03; Buchanan, supra note 13, at 401 n.444. 
52. See Norwood, 413 U.S. at 465. 
53. See Buchanan, supra note 13, at 390-410. 
54. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724 (1961). See infra 
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lyzed the combined effect of these factors. This so-called "totality 
approach" "seeks to determine how far the combined force of rele­
vant contact factors has .moved along the state nexus continuum."55 
To determine state action, in other words, the Court will consider 
the combined weight of all the nexus factors, when none alone is 
sufficient, and ask whether, in the aggregate, a sufficient nexus ex­
ists between the private actor and the state. 
This totality approach was exemplified in the case of Burton v. 
Wilmington Parking Authority.56 In Burton, the Eagle Coffee 
Shoppe, a privately owned restaurant, refused to serve a customer 
solely because he was African-American.57 The coffee shop was lo­
cated within an off-street automobile parking garage owned and op­
erated by the Wilmington, Delaware Parking Authority 
{"Authority").58 The owner of the coffee shop leased the space 
from the Authority.59 In reversing the Delaware Supreme Court, 
which had found no state action by focusing only on one factor­
the rental money the shop paid to the Authority-the United States 
Supreme Court found that the case turned on the consideration of a 
variety of factors.6o Importantly, none of these "other factors" in 
isolation was sufficient to find state action. Instead, the Court con­
sidered their combined weight to find that the state "ha[ d] elected 
to place its power, property and prestige behind the [challenged 
conduct]."61 
notes 56-60 and accompanying text for further explanation of the totality approach of 
Burton. See also Buchanan, supra note 13, at 396; Phillips, supra note 13, at 697. 
55. Buchanan, supra note 13, at 397; see also Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 
50 (1992); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 621 (1991); Evans v. 
Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966). 
56. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). 
57. See id. at 716. 
58. See id. 
59. See id. 
60. The Court stated that the Delaware Supreme Court's conclusion was incor­
rect "when evaluated in the context of other factors which must be acknowledged." Id. 
at 723. The other factors cited by the United States Supreme Court included: (1) the 
government owned the land and the building and leased it to the coffee shop; (2) the 
property leased to the shop and other lessees "[was] not surplus state property, but 
constituted a physically and financial integral and, indeed, indispensable part of the 
State's plan to operate its project as a self-sustaining unit[;]" (3) "the peculiar relation­
ship of the restaurant to the parking facility in which it is located confers on each an 
incidental variety of mutual benefits;" and (4) the restaurant where the discrimination 
occurred is located in a government owned and operated building. Id. at 723-24. 
61. Id. at 725. In Justice Clark's words: 
Addition of all these activities, obligations and responsibilities of the Author­
ity, the benefits mutually conferred, together with the obvious fact that the 
restaurant is operated as an integral part of a public building devoted to a 
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3. The Sequential Approach 
After Burton, however, the Court slowly shifted to a "sequen­
tial approach" for its state action analysis.62 With the sequential 
approach, the Court considered "each state nexus factor ... in iso­
lation and then discarded [it] completely if, by itself, it lack[ed] suf­
ficient force to convert private action into state action."63 This 
approach focuses only on those factors that alone would be suffi­
cient to find state action, and it does not consider whether the fac­
tor might contribute in the aggregate to a finding of state action.64 
public parking service, indicates that degree of state participation and involve­
ment [necessary to create state action]. 
Id. at 724 (emphasis added); see also Isaacs v. Board of Trustees of Temple Univ., 385 F. 
Supp. 473, 488 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (using Burton's totality approach to find state action in a 
private university's employment termination decisions, which plaintiffs alleged violated 
their First Amendment rights); Phillips, supra note 13, at 697 (noting that Burton's con­
clusions implied that the nexus factors "should be assessed in their cumulative impact, 
and not as discrete factors one or more of which must itself support a state action find­
ing"); Buchanan, supra note 13, at 39l. 
62. See Buchanan, supra note 13, at 401. According to Buchanan, the shift be­
came "evident" with Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), which 
found no state action after analyzing, and dismissing as insufficient, each nexus factor 
one at a time, but not considering them all told. See Buchanan, supra note 13, at 401­
02; see also Phillips, supra note 13, at 704, 716. For example, in his dissent in Jackson, 
Justice Douglas stated the following: "It is not enough to examine seriatim each of the 
factors upon which a claimant relies and to dismiss each individually as being insuffi­
cient to support a finding of state action. It is the aggregate that is controlling." Jackson, 
419 U.S. at 362-63 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Marshall also 
commented about this retreat when he concluded that "[t]aking these factors together, I 
have no difficulty finding state action in this case." Id. at 366 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
The reason for the Supreme Court moving away from Burton is, in part, because it 
is distinguishable as a race discrimination case, where Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 
(1982), and Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982), were procedural due process 
claims. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 251-52 (1985). See infra 
Part LA.5 for further discussion of how the court may be varying its state action analy­
sis according to the constitutional right at stake. 
63. Buchanan, supra note 13, at 402. 
64. The shift to the sequential approach went into full swing with Rendell-Baker 
v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840 (1982) (finding no state action when a private school dis­
charged teachers even though the school received over ninety percent of its funding 
from the state), and Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1011 (1982) (finding no state action 
when a nursing home discharged or transferred patients even though the state funded 
and regulated it). Justices Brennan and Marshall joined in dissenting in these cases, 
objecting to the courts shift from Burton's totality approach. See Rendell-Baker, 457 
U.S. at 851-52 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Even though there are myriad indicia of state 
action in this case, the majority refuses to find that the school acted under color of state 
law when it discharged petitioners. The decision in this case marks a return to empty 
formalism in state action doctrine." (emphasis added»; see also Phillips, supra note 13, 
at 719 (noting that "[t]he cumulative approach to indicia of state action recommended 
by Burton, while not officially disavowed, has been tacitly replaced by a sequential 
treatment of such factors" (emphasis added»; Buchanan, supra note 13, at 404-06. 
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4. A Partial Return to the Totality Approach 
Recently, the Supreme Court has partly revived the totality ap­
proach for its nexus analysis.65 The Court has been willing to con­
sider the combined weight of all the nexus factors, even if one alone 
is insufficient by itself to constitute state action.66 For example, in 
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. ,67 a civil action where the 
plaintiff objected to the defendant's use of peremptory challenges, 
and Georgia v. McCollum,68 a criminal action where the prosecu­
tion objected to the defendant's use of peremptory challenges, the 
. Court found state action where the use of these peremptory chal­
lenges excluded jurors on the basis of their race. In Edmonson, the 
Court's state action analysis included, in part, a nexus test which 
described in detail the "overt, significant participation of ... gov­
ernment [in] the peremptory challenge system."69 It concluded that 
"a private party could not exercise its peremptory challenges absent 
the overt, significant assistance of the court."70 Importantly, the 
Supreme Court cited Burton in stressing that the court "ha[ d] not 
only made itself a party to the [racial act], but ha[d] elected to place 
its power, property and prestige behind the [alleged] discrimina­
tion."71 In essence, then, the government was responsible for the 
65. See Buchanan, supra note 13, at 420-23 (arguing that Edmonson v. Leesville 
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991), Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992), and 
NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988), "display a returning willingness by the Court 
to consider the combined weight of all state contact"); see also Krotoszynski, supra note 
13, at 304-05, 322-35 (arguing that recent decisions of lower federal courts were 
"fail[ing) ... to honor the Supreme Court's admonition that its various verbal formula­
tions of state action are but 'different ways of characterizing [a) necessarily fact-bound 
inquiry.'" (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982»). 
66. See Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 622-25. 
67. 500 U.S. 614 (1991). 
68. 505 U.S. 42 (1992). 
69. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 622 (emphasis added). 
70. Id. at 624. 
71. Id. The Court also employed this analysis in McCollum. In McCollum, the 
Court noted that a white criminal defendant, who used peremptory challenges in a ra­
cially discriminatory way, "relie[d) on 'governmental assistance and benefits' that are 
equivalent to those found in the civil context in Edmonson. 'By enforcing discrimina­
tory peremptory challenge, the Court "has ... elected to place its power, property and 
prestige behind the [alleged) discrimination."'" McCollum, 505 U.S. at 52 (citing Ed­
monson, 500 U.S. at 624). For a critical comment on the Court's reasoning in McCol­
lum, see Susan M. Sabers, The Absence ofState Action in Georgia v. McCollum, 39 S.D. 
L. REV. 159 (1994). For a recent application of the totality approach in the Ninth Cir­
cuit, see Grijalva v. Shalala, 152 F.3d 1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 1998). In Grijalva, the court 
found state action when a health maintenance organization denied services to Medicare 
beneficiaries without adequate notice. See id. Importantly, the court used the totality 
approach in its application of the Supreme Court's nexus analysis. For example, after 
considering numerous nexus factors individually, the court held that "ea~h of these 
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discriminatory act because it had created a framework within which 
a private person could discriminate.72 
5. Variable State Action Approach 
The Supreme Court has applied the totality approach, which is 
an easier state action standard to overcome than the sequential ap­
proach, primarily in race discrimination cases,73 while it has applied 
the sequential approach primarily in due process cases.74 As such, 
some commentators suggest that the Court is tacitly varying the 
state action standard according to the importance of the constitu­
tional violation alleged.75 
Even though the Supreme Court has not explicitly ruled on the 
relationship between state action analysis and the nature of the al­
leged constitutional violation,76 numerous lower federal courts have 
[nexus] factors alone might not be sufficient to establish federal action. Together they 
show federal action." Id. (emphasis added); see also Catanzano v. Dowling, 60 F.3d 113, 
117-20 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying similar analysis in Medicaid context); J.K. v. Dillenberg, 
836 F. Supp. 694, 697-99 (D. Ariz. 1993) (applying similar analysis in Medicaid context). 
72. See Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 624. 
73. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992); Edmonson v. Leesville Con­
crete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Burton v. Wil­
mington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961). But cf. Moose Lodge Number 107 v. Irvis, 
407 U.S. 163 (1972). 
74. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 
830 (1982); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. 
Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). 
75. See Phillips, supra note 13, at 738 ("The Supreme Court may not have openly 
considered such matters, but there is reason to believe that the 'hierarchy of constitu­
tional values' approach has influenced the Court's state action decisions."); see also 
TRIBE, supra note 13, § 18-3, at 1699 ("The state action requirement fixes a frame of 
reference. The substantive constitutional right at issue initially determines the parame­
ters of this frame."); Nat Stem, State Action, Establishment Clause, and Defamation: 
Blueprints for Civil Liberties in the Rehnquist Court, 57 U. ClN. L. REv. 1175, 1216 
(1989) ("It seems obvious that the Court tacitly engages in 'differential state action 
analysis,' under which the Court's willingness to find state action correlates to the im­
portance that it attaches to the constitutional value at stake."); Morgan W.Tovey, Dial­
A-Porn and the First Amendment: The State Action Loophole, 40 FED. COMM. L.J. 267, 
285 (1988) ("[W]hether the Court finds state action often appears to be dependent 
upon the underlying constitutional right at stake."). 
76. See, e.g., Jackson, 419 U.S. at 373-74 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that 
"[t]he Court has not adopted the notion ... that different standards should apply to 
state action analysis when different constitutional claims are presented"). The Supreme 
Court recently had the opportunity to address the variable approach to state action, but 
declined the offer. See Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 408 
(1995) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In Lebron, the Court reversed the Second Circuit's 
holding that no state action existed when Amtrak refused an artist's advertisement be­
cause of its political content. See id. at 375. Importantly, the Second Circuit's refusal to 
find state action was based on a variable state action approach since it acknowledged 
that the outcome would have been different if the refusal had been based on race. See 
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applied varying standards of state action analysis depending on the 
type of constitutional right at stake.77 Labeled "differential state 
action analysis,"78 these courts have created a hierarchy of state ac­
tion standards keyed to different substantive rights.79 Generally, 
the courts have applied the liberal state action standards to race 
discrimination cases and the stricter standards to procedural due 
process cases, with gender discrimination and free speech falling 
somewhere in the middle.80 
Some courts have suggested that the rationale for this ap­
proach is grounded in the roots of the state action doctrine itself. 
Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 12 F.3d 388, 392 (2d Cir. 1993), rev'd, 513 
U.S. 374 (1995). The Supreme Court's reversal did not address this variable state action 
approach in its holding, but instead focused on whether Amtrak was a private or public 
entity. Finding Amtrak to be a governmental entity, the Court avoided the variable 
state action question. See Lebron, 513 U.S. at 408 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
77. The most prominent of these lower federal courts is the Second Circuit, which 
has explicitly keyed its state action standard to the type of constitutional claim ad­
vanced. See Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 405-08 (2d Cir. 1975) (suggesting 
that state action would be found more readily in cases of racial and perhaps gender 
discrimination than in First Amendment cases); Coleman v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 
1120, 1127 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J., concurring) ("[R]acial discrimination is so pecu­
liarly offensive and was so much the prime target of the Fourteenth Amendment that a 
lesser degree of involvement may constitute 'state action' with respect to it than would 
be required in other contexts ...."); see also Taylor v. Consolidated Edison, Co., 552 
F.2d 39, 42-43 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that a lesser amount of government involvement 
is needed to find state action in a racial discrimination case than in due process and 
First Amendment cases; a lesser amount of government involvement is needed in sexual 
discrimination cases as well). For an extensive list of cases in the Second Circuit, as well 
as other circuits, that discuss the relationship between the constitutional rights alleged 
and the state action requirement, see Jody Young Jakosa, Parsing Public from Private: 
The Failure of Differential State Action Analysis, 19 HARV. c.R.-c.L. L. REV. 193, 195 
n.8 & n.lO (1984). In addition, see Martin B. Margulies, 1994: The First Amendment in 
the Second Circuit and District of Connecticut, 14 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 565, 567-69 
(1994) (discussing, in part, the history of the Second Circuit's variable state action 
approach). 
78. For purposes of this Note, "differential state action analysis" is referred to as 
"variable" state action analysis because the term more clearly expresses the idea that 
state action should vary with the constitutional right at stake. 
79. See Jakosa, supra note 77, at 206. 
80. See Jackson v. Statler Found., 496 F.2d 623, 629 (2d Cir. 1974) (recognizing "a 
less onerous [state action] test for cases involving racial discrimination, and a more 
rigorous standard for other claims"); Stearns v. Veterans of Foreign Wars, 394 F. Supp. 
138,144 n.7 (D.D.C. 1975) (holding that race discrimination state action precedents not 
applicable to gender discrimination), affd, 527 F.2d 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1976); see also 
Jakosa, supra note 77, at 199-202 (noting that most courts have been reluctant to re­
solve the issue of whether the liberal state action standard for race discrimination cases 
should also apply to gender discrimination cases, thus leaving gender cases somewhere 
in the middle); id. at 202 n.38 (citations therein). But cf. Grijalva v. Shalala, 152 F.3d 
1115 (9th Cir. 1998) (applying the less onerous totality approach in the context of a due 
process violation). 
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The state action doctrine originated in the Civil Rights Cases ,81 
when race discrimination was an invidious wrong that the recon­
struction amendments, especially the Fourteenth Amendment, 
aimed to eradicate.82 This level of concern over race discrimination 
is evidenced in the Supreme Court's use of strict scrutiny review 
when it analyzes the merits of race discrimination cases, while using 
intermediate review to evaluate cases of gender discrimination and 
only minimal scrutiny in cases involving nonfundamental rights.83 
Whatever the rationale, however, lower courts have suggested that 
less state involvement needs to be found with constitutional viola­
tions that courts take more seriously on the merits, hence creating a 
hierarchy of constitutional rights keyed to different standards of 
state action. 
B. State Action in the Public High School Context 
On several occasions the Supreme Court has been called upon 
to apply state action analysis in the context of public schools. In 
each of these cases, state action was presumed or conceded where 
students claimed that public school administrators violated their 
First Amendment rights, as these administrators were deemed state 
officials.84 United States courts of appeals have also found state 
81. 109 u.s. 3 (1883). 
82. See NAACP v. Thompson, 648 F. Supp. 195, 244 (D. Md. 1986) (noting that 
"the level of state action may be de minimis when racial discrimination is alleged be­
cause the hallmark of the Fourteenth Amendment has been to safeguard against dis­
crimination based on race"); see also Scott v. Eversole Mortuary, 522 F.2d 1110, 1117 
(9th Cir. 1975) (Ely, J., concurring and dissenting in part); Coleman v. Wagner College, 
429 F.2d 1120, 1127 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J., concurring); Edwards v. Habib, 397 
F.2d 687, 693 (D.C. Cir. 1968); New York City Jaycees, Inc. v. United States Jaycees, 
Inc., 377 F. Supp. 481,488 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd, 512 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1975); Oller v. 
Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21, 23 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F. 
Supp. 1382, 1392-93 (N.D. Ind. 1970); Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1966 
Term-Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 
HARv. L. REv. 69, 82 (1967). 
83. Under the strict scrutiny test, the alleged constitutional violation will be held 
invalid unless it is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. See Palmore v. 
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984). Under the minimal scrutiny test, an alleged constitu­
tional violation will be presumed valid if it bears a rational relationship to the end 
sought. See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 592-94 (1979). Under 
the intermediate scrutiny test, an alleged constitutional violation will be held invalid 
unless it bears a substantial relationship to an important government interest. See Craig 
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976). 
84. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (presuming 
state action when students filed a First Amendment complaint against their high school 
principal's act of deleting student articles from the high school paper); Bethel Sch. Dist. 
v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (presuming state action when school officials disciplined a 
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action where public school officials acted together with, or en­
couraged, students to produce the challenged constitutional 
violation.85 
However, courts have not yet addressed the state action issue 
in a scenario where public high school students, acting indepen­
dently, allegedly infringe upon another's constitutional rights.86 In 
such a case a court would apply the nexus test by analyzing the 
following questions. Had the school, by law, by regulation, or by 
participation, compelled, encouraged, or assisted the high school 
student newspaper editors' actions? Or, do the student editors' ac­
tions have sufficient contact with the school officials vis-a-vis school 
regulations, mutual benefits (a symbiotic relationship), or direct 
funding?87 This novel scenario was presented, and these questions 
were raised, in the case of Yeo v. Town of Lexington.88 
II. YEO V. TOWN OF LEXINGTON 
This section will discuss the case of Yeo v. Town of Lexington 
in detail. After presenting the facts of the case, it will discuss the 
opinion of the United States District Court for the District of Mas­
sachusetts. It will then discuss the state action arguments of the 
majority and dissenting opinions of the three judge panel of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Finally, the 
section will discuss the majority and concurring opinions in the First 
student for inappropriate language at a school assembly); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. 
Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (presuming state action when striking down 
school officials' regulation against wearing anti-Vietnam arm bands); see also Vernonia 
Sch. Dist. v. Action, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (presuming state action when student filed a 
Fourth Amendment claim against school district). 
85. See Planned Parenthood v. Clark County Sch. Bd., 941 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 
1991) (finding state action when high school students' decision to reject ads from 
outside vendor was in compliance with school board policy); San Diego Comm. Against 
Registration and the Draft v. Governing Bd. of the Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 
790 F.2d 1471 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding state action when high school students' decision 
to reject an ad from an outside political group was directed by the school board). 
86. College student-run newspapers are the closest analogue, and in these cases 
courts have been reluctant to find state action. See, e.g., Leeds v. Meltz, 85 F.3d 51, 53­
55 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding no state action where student editors of law school journal 
rejected ad); Sinn v. Daily Nebraskan, 829 F.2d 662, 665 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding no state 
action in refusal to print an ad where the student paper "maintains its editorial freedom 
from the state"); Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, 536 F.2d 1073, 1075 (5th Cir. 
1976) (finding no state action when editors of college student newspaper refused to run 
ad); Avins v. Rutgers, 385 F.2d 151, 153-54 (3d Cir. 1967) (presuming no state action 
where state-supported law review rejected an article since editorial discretion is an es­
sential element of publishing a journal). 
87. See supra Part I.A for a discussion of the nexus test and its sub-factors. 
88. 131 F.3d 241 (1st Cir. 1997) (en bane), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2060 (1998). 
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Circuit's en banc decision, which reversed the three judge panel and 
affirmed the district court's decision that no state action existed. 
A. Case Facts 
In 1992, the Lexington School Committee decided "to dis­
tribute condoms and information regarding sexually transmitted 
diseases to students without parental consent."89 Douglas Yeo, a 
town resident and parent, opposed the decision and formed a polit­
ical action group that successfully placed the issue on the 1993 
Town Ballot in the form of a town-wide referendum on the School 
Committee's condom policy.90 The town sided with the School 
Committee; the voters approved the condom policy.91 In response, 
Yeo helped establish the Lexington Parents Information Network 
("LEXNET") "to educate parents on public school issues."92 On 
behalf of LEXNET, Yeo submitted an advertisement promoting ab­
stinence to the Lexington High School ("LHS") Yearbook.93 
The LHS Yearbook was run by students. A staff of about sixty 
students made all editorial, business, and staffing decisions.94 A 
LHS teacher advised the students, and the school paid her a stipend 
of less than $2,000 for that job.95 This stipend and the use of LHS 
buildings and facilities were the only support the Yearbook re­
ceived from the schoo1.96 Money from the sales of advertising and 
books entirely funded the Yearbook, allowing it to be financially 
independent from the schoo1.97 
The co-editors of the Yearbook rejected Yeo's ad and in­
structed their faculty advisor to call Yeo and offer him a chance to 
rewrite the ad "in a tone more appropriate to the mission of the 
Yearbook."98 Yeo rejected the offer, and the faculty advisor subse­
quently sent Yeo a letter reaffirming the students' decision.99 Yeo 
89. Yeo v. Town of Lexington, No. 94-10811-RGS, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7310, at 
*7 (D. Mass. Apr. 22, 1996), affd en bane, 131 F.3d 241 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 
S. Ct. 2060 (1998). 
90. See id. 
91. See id. 
92. [d. at *9. 
93. See id. See supra note 5 for the text of the ad. 
94. See Yeo v. Town of Lexington, 131 F.3d 241, 243 (1st Cir. 1997) (en banc), 
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2060 (1998). 
95. See id. 
96. See id. 
97. See id. 
98. Yeo, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7310, at *10. 
99. See id. at *11. Karen Mechem, a LHS reading teacher and the Yearbook 
faculty advisor since 1980, stated that "because of the non-controversial nature of the 
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responded, by demanding that the Yearbook reconsider its deci­
sion. lOO The Yearbook editors subsequently reaffirmed their deci­
sion to reject the ad, which the faculty advisor communicated to 
Yeo.1° l 
Yeo also submitted a similar advertisement to the LHS news­
paper, the Musket. 102 Like the Yearbook, the Musket was student­
written and edited, with the students making all editorial, opera­
tional, and staffing decisions.103 Its faculty advisor received $1,373 
for that activity, and the School Committee provided funding of 
$4,500 per year.104 The only LHS property that the Musket used 
was a mailbox; moreover, all the editorial layouts were done at the 
editors' homes.lo5 
After receiving the advertisement request, the newspaper's 
business editor wrote to Yeo on behalf of the Musket informing him 
that the newspaper had rejected the ad.106 Yeo protested to school 
officials, who advised the students that they should print the ad.lo7 
Nonetheless, the student editors reiterated their decision not to 
publish the ad. lo8 
B. 	 The United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts 
Yeo filed a complaint in the United States District Court for 
advertising section of the yearbook, we have decided not to print [the] advertising you 
have submitted." Id. The panel decision had used Ms. Mechem's use of "we" as evi­
dence of the school's involvement in the decision to reject the ad, but later the panel's 
author, Judge Stahl, was convinced that it did not implicate the school. See Yeo, 131 
F.3d at 257 (Stahl, J., concurring). 
100. 	 See Yeo, 131 F.3d at 245. 
101. 	 See id. 
102. See id. The advertisement sent to the newspaper had an additional line in­
structing students to contact LEXNET. See id. 
103. 	 See id. at 243-44. 
104. 	 See id. 
105. 	 See id. at 244. 
106. See Yeo v. Town of Lexington, No. 94-10811-RGS, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
7310, at *11 (D. Mass. Apr. 22, 1996), affd en bane, 131 F.3d 241 (1st Cir. 1997), eert. 
denied, 118 S. Ct. 2060 (1998). 
107. See id. at *12-13. The superintendent, Jeffrey Young, wanted the ads printed 
"because the Town Counsel had determined that they should be published." Id. at *13. 
David Wilson, the school principal, even assured Yeo that the ads would be published 
and accepted from Yeo the uncashed $200 check for payment that the Yearbook had 
returned to him. See id. 
108. See id. at *14. The students' decision occurred at a final meeting between 
the student editors of both the Musket and the Yearbook, the faculty advisors of each 
publication, the LHS Vice Principal (sitting in for the Principal), the Superintendent, 
and two members of the school board. See id. 
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the District of Massachusetts claiming that the Town of Lexington, 
among others,109 violated his right to free speech guaranteed by the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitu­
tion and by Article XVI of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights.110 The defendants moved for summary judgment on the 
grounds that "any alleged violation of [Yeo's] right to free speech 
cannot be ascribed to state action."111 Both the Yearbook and the 
Musket, the defendants argued, were independently run student 
publications, and as such, their editors' acts were those of private 
individuals immune from constitutional challenge.1l2 
Yeo argued that the publications' decisions were state actions, 
109. Among the other parties that Yeo named as defendants were David Wilson, 
the principal of the Lexington High School; Jeffrey Young, the superintendent of the 
Lexington Schools; Samuel Kafrissen, the teacher/advisor of the school newspaper, the 
Musket; Karen Mechem, the teacher/advisor of the LHS Yearbook; and the five mem­
bers of the Lexington School Committee, John Oberteuffer, Lois Coit, Joseph Dini, 
Susan Elberger, and Barrie Peltz, who were individually named as defendants. See id. 
at *2, *3 n.l. No student editor, however, was named as a defendant. 
110. See id. at *2-3. 
111. Id. at *15. 
112. See id. at *16. To bolster their case, the defendants argued that the publica­
tions operated independently of the school officials as required under Massachusetts 
law, which forbids school officials from abridging students' right to freedom of expres­
sion and as such releases school officials from any civil or criminal responsibility result­
ing from that speech. See id. at *16 n.13. The law mandates in relevant part: 
The right of students to freedom of expression in the public schools of the 
commonwealth shall not be abridged, provided that such right shall not cause 
any disruption or disorder within the school. Freedom of expression shall in­
clude without limitation, the rights and responsibilities of students, collectively 
and individually, (a) to express their views through speech and symbols, (b) to 
write, publish and disseminate their views, (c) to assemble peaceably on school 
property .... 
No expression made by students in the exercise of such rights shall be 
deemed to be an expression of school policy and no school officials shall be 
held responsible in any civil or criminal action for any expression made or 
published by the students. 
For the purposes of this section and sections eighty-three to eighty-five, 
inclusive, the word student shall mean any person attending a public secon­
dary school in the commonwealth. The word school official shall mean any 
member or employee of the local school committee. 
MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 82 (1996). Originally the statute was elective, but on July 
14, 1988, "in response to the [Hazelwood] decision, [which limited high school student 
free speech,] the Massachusetts legislature made the provision mandatory." J. Marc 
Abrams & Mark Goodman, End of an Era? the Decline of Student Press Rights in the 
Wake of Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 1988 DUKE L.J. 706,730 n.172; see 
also, Frank Phillips, Legislative Committee Backs Bill to Bar Censoring of School Pa­
pers, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 25, 1988, at B21. Four other states responded to Hazel­
wood with similar mandatory statutes. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-18-1201 to -1204 
(Mitchie 1995); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-120 (West 1990); IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 280.22 (West 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-1504 to -1506 (1992). California's student 
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and he advanced two theories to support his position.113 First, Yeo 
argued that the court should find state action because of the close 
relationship between the LHS publications and the school authori­
ties.114 For example, he argued that both publications received fi­
nancial support from the school, both were regulated curricular 
activities, and both enjoyed a symbiotic or mutually beneficial rela­
tionship with the schooJ.115 The court disagreed, finding that 
neither financial support nor regulated activity alone was sufficient 
for a finding of state action.116 It stated that the proper test for 
finding state action is whether the state meaningfully participated in 
the challenged act.117 The court added that meaningful participa­
tion requires a mutually beneficial relationship (or a symbiotic rela­
tionship), and that such a relationship did not exist in this case.118 
Yeo argued, in the alternative, that there was state action be­
cause the school officials" 'held themselves ... out as [being] capa­
ble of resolving' the conflict" and thus the court should infer that 
the school officials were the real actors.119 The court, however, 
noted that there was no evidence that anyone except the students 
actually made the decision to reject Yeo's adsPo At best, the court 
maintained, school officials might have approved or acquiesced in 
the decision, but that alone was insufficient to establish state ac­
tionPl Thus, the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts granted the defendants' motion for summary 
free speech statute, CALIF. EDUC. CODE § 48907 (West 1983), existed prior to the Ha­
zelwood decision. 
113. See Yeo, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7310, at *17. 
114. See id. at *18-23. 
115. See supra Part LA.1 for a discussion of these nexus factors for determining 
state action. Yeo's state action argument was based on the Eighth Circuit's decision in 
Sinn v. Daily Nebraskan, 829 F.2d 662, 665 (8th Cir. 1987) (upholding a student-run 
college newspaper's refusal to print an ad where the student paper "maintains its edito­
rial freedom from the state"). The court in Sinn provided four factors for determining 
state action: "(1) extensive regulation, (2) receipt of public funds, (3) type of function 
involved [i.e., the public function test], and (4) presence of a symbiotic relationship." 
Id. at 665; see also Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840-42 (1982) (establishing the 
four factors for finding state action). Yeo argued that only the third factor did not exist. 
See Yeo, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7310, at *18 n.16. 
116. See Yeo, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7310, at *19-21. 
117. See id. at *23. 
118. See id. 
119. Id. (quoting Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition, at 31-32). 
120. See id. at *24. The court noted that Yeo offered "nothing other than per­
sonal conjecture to dispute the student editors' sworn affidavits that they made the 
decision to reject Yeo's advertisement." Id. 
121. See id. at *26 (citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004-05 (1982)). 
205 1999] STUDENT EDITORS AS STATE ACTORS 
judgment.122 
C. 	 United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Panel 
Decision 
Yeo appealed the district court's decision to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, and a panel of the First Cir­
cuit reversed the district court's ruling.123 The First Circuit panel 
held that the defendant, Lexington High School, did engage in state 
action when it denied Douglas Yeo access to advertisement space in 
the Musket and the Yearbook.124 This section will discuss the rea­
soning of the majority and dissent with respect to the state action 
issue. 
1. 	 The Majority Opinion 
Under the facts of Yeo, the majority, in an opinion written by 
Judge Stahl, found the controlling framework for state action analy­
sis established in the most recent Supreme Court case on public 
high school free speech, Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.125 
The majority interpreted Hazelwood as providing the test for find­
ing state action in this context: state action exists if it is reasonable 
122. 	 See id. at *28. 
123. See Yeo v. Town of Lexington, No. 96-1623, 1997 WL 292173, at *1 (1st Cir. 
June 6, 1997), rev'd en bane, 131 F.3d 241 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2060 
(1998). 
124. See id. at *4. After finding state action, the court analyzed the merits of 
Yeo's First Amendment argument. The court held that the students' decision to reject 
Yeo's ads violated his First Amendment right to free speech. See id. at *8-18; see also 
id. at *29-35 (Lynch, J., dissenting). But since the panel's decision was vacated for lack 
of state action, and the en banc court did not reach the merits of the First Amendment 
issue, this Note focuses only on the state action question. For a critical discussion of the 
panel's First Amendment analysis, see John Matthew Berner, Casenote and Comment, 
Abstinence, Advertisements, and the Abridgment of First Amendment Student Press 
Rights: Yeo v. Town of Lexington, No. 96-1623, 1997 WL 292173 (lst Cir. June 6,1997), 
21 HAMLINE L. REv. 181, 211-21 (1997). 
125. See Yeo, 1997 WL 292173, at *5; see also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 
484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (holding that a public high school principal did not violate high 
school students' First Amendment rights when he censored two articles from a high 
school newspaper). 
The majority in Yeo began by attacking the district court's reliance on Sinn v. Daily 
Nebraskan, 829 F.2d 662, 665 (8th Cir. 1987), and Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 
840-42 (1982), for its holding of no state action. The First Circuit panel found these 
cases distinguishable because the former involved a college newspaper at a state-sup­
ported university, and the latter involved teacher diSCharges from private, special-needs 
schools. The case at bar, however, involved publications at a public high school. See 
Yeo, 1997 WL 292173, at *5. 
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to perceive that the publications "bore the imprimatur(126] of the 
school."127 Applying this "imprimatur test," the majority held that 
state action existed since there was a reasonable perception that the 
publications bore the imprimatur of the school-faculty members 
supervised both publications, and both were designed to educate 
and train student participants.128 Moreover, the majority found 
that the student editors were not "wholly private actors" but were 
the representatives of public school publications, which bore the 
imprimatur of the school and which the school distributed to the 
publicJ29 As such, the court held that the Musket's and the Year­
126. An "imprimatur" is Latin for "let it be printed." It is a license or an allow­
ance "giving permission to print or publish a book." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 756 
(6th ed. 1990). 
127. Yeo, 1997 WL 292173, at *5. The majority opinion interpreted Hazelwood to 
mean that state action exists "where one confronts 'school-sponsored publications, the­
atrical productions, and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members 
of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.'" Id. 
(quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271). 
In their brief for an en banc hearing, the defendants directly challenged the major­
ity's interpretation of Hazelwood as containing an "imprimatur test." For example, the 
defendants argued that this state action test was not found in Hazelwood; in fact, the 
words "state action" do not appear in the opinion, and Hazelwood never even ad­
dressed the issue of state action. State action was presumed in Hazelwood because the 
students filed suit against the school principal. See En Banc Brief for Defendants-Ap­
pellees at 5, Yeo v. Town of Lexington, 131 F.3d 241 (1st Cir. 1997) (No. 96-1623). 
Additionally, neither the district court nor the plaintiff considered Hazelwood as a 
source for its state action analysis. See Yeo v. Town of Lexington, No. 94-10811-RGS, 
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7310, at *18 (D. Mass. Apr. 22, 1996), affd en bane 131 F.3d 241 
(1st Cir. 1997), eert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2060 (1998). 
128. See Yeo, 1997 WL 292173, at *6. In articulating additional reasons to rein­
force its conclusion that the publications bore the imprimatur of the school, the court 
stated the following: 
First, the high school's principal controlled the bank checking accounts of both 
publications. Moreover, the principal's affidavit indicates that he and other 
Lexington school officials retained authority and discretion over what the 
school publications would publish and that they were prepared to exercise 
such authority in cases involving a student desire to publish obscenity or other 
illegal material. In addition, the newspaper was largely funded with monies 
from the public fisc. Finally, both publications' faculty advisors received 
school salary supplements of several thousand dollars annually based on the 
additional responsibilities associated with their respective positions relative to 
the publications. 
[d. (footnote omitted). 
129. Id. at *7. The court noted that state action existed regardless of any factual 
dispute over whether the students made independent or private decisions: 
Our [state action] analysis would not change even if the town defendants con­
vinced us that the student editors rejected the ads independently of Kafrissen, 
Mechem, Wilson, Young, and the other school officials with whom they were 
in close contact. ... [The] Government cannot say that its behavior cannot be 
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book's refusal to publish Yeo's ads constituted state action.13° 
2. Dissenting Opinion 
In dissent, Judge Lynch disagreed with the majority's state ac­
tion analysis. She concluded that no state action existed because, in 
both publications, the students acted as independent editors, and 
their actions could not be fairly attributed to the school.131 
Under the facts of Yeo,132 the dissent noted that two ap­
proaches existed to finding state action.133 The first approach re­
quired that the school administration's decision not to interfere 
constitute state action.134 The second approach required that all 
the facts "taken together in context" sufficed to produce state ac­
tion.135 Yeo, the dissent concluded, failed on both accounts.136 
In addressing the issue of whether the school offiCials' decision 
not to interfere should have constituted state action, the dissent 
noted that the leading Supreme Court decisions were "meaningfully 
different" and "thus provide[d] little guidance" for answering this 
question.137 Specifically, the dissent noted that Hazelwood, which 
the majority used to frame its analysis, involved students' claims 
against public school administrators,138 while the present case, by 
contrast, involved a non-student's claim against the inaction of 
challenged because it was not acting independently, but rather was merely fol­
lowing "private" orders. 
Id. at *7 n.8. (citations omitted). . 
130. See id. at *7. The court rejected the defendant's argument that Chapter 7, 
section 82(b) of the General Laws of Massachusetts precluded a finding of state action, 
since state action analysis preempted it, and since the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court has not addressed the issue of "the right of student-edited, school-sponsored pub­
lications to reject advertisements submitted to them." Id. at *7 & n.9. 
131. See id. at *29 (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
132. The dissent noted that Yeo did not sue the students, but rather the public 
school administrators, teachers, and members of the Lexington School Committee, who 
were presumably state officials. See id. at *26 (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
133. See id. (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
134. See id. (Lynch, J., dissenting). If the court believed that the school officials 
had affirmatively acted in the decision to reject Yeo's ad, then there would be little need 
for state action analysis because state action is presumed when a state official produces 
the challenged conduct. See id. (Lynch, J., dissenting). Because the government chose 
not to act in the present case, and the Constitution does not require or forbid them to 
act, the dissent noted that the "state action analysis is thus placed squarely in a very 
complex and changing area of th,e law." Id. (Lynch, J., dissenting). See supra Part I.A 
for further discussion of state action analysis. 
135. Yeo, 1997 WL 292173, at * 26 (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
136. See id. at *29 (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
137. Id. at *26 (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
138. See id. (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
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school officials.139 
To answer this state action question, the dissent utilized two 
tests: the public function test and the nexus test.140 First the dissent 
asked, did the state delegate a traditional public function to a pri­
vate actor?141 According to the dissent, running a school newspa­
per was neither a traditional government function, nor the exclusive 
prerogative of the state.142 Thus, according to the dissent, Yeo 
could not establish state action using the public function test. 
Next, the dissent applied the nexus test: was there a sufficient 
connection between state regulation, financial support, and the 
challenged conduct?143 Judge Lynch noted that although each pub­
lication received some financial support, there was "very little inter­
play between the decision here and the state. "144 The dissent found 
that the financial relationship played no role in compelling, either 
covertly or overtly, the students' decision to reject the ads.145 
139. See id. (Lynch, J., dissenting). The dissent cited additional Supreme Court 
decisions regarding high schools and students that it also considered distinguishable. 
See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (students challenged school 
officials' disciplinary actions); Tmker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 
(1969) (student challenged school officials' censorship actions); see also Vernonia Sch. 
Dist. v. Action, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (students challenged school district's mandatory 
drug testing). 
The dissent further noted that "it is difficult to shoehorn the facts of this case into 
the fact patterns of the modern state action cases." Yeo, 1997 WL 292173, at *26 
(Lynch, J., dissenting). On this point the dissent queried: 
Is this case like Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982), where the actions 
of a private school, almost entirely funded by the state and closely regulated 
by public authorities, were found not to be state action? Arguably not, be­
cause this case involves a public school. Is it more like Edmonson v. Leesville 
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991), where a private litigant's race-based exer­
cise of peremptory challenges was found to be state action? Arguably not, 
because the alleged deprivation here does not implicate a traditional function 
of the government. Is it more like NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988), 
where an unincorporated association of public and private colleges was found 
not to be a state actor even though the association's actions led a public col­
lege to take disciplinary action against a basketball coach? Arguably not, be­
cause in this case the state actors, the adults, have a supervisory relationship to 
the private group, the students, and are thus somewhat the inverse of the 
NCAA and the public college. 
Yeo, 1997 WL 292173, at *26 (Lynch, J., dissenting) (parallel citations omitted). 
140. See Yeo, 1997 WL 292173, at *26 (Lynch, J., dissenting). See supra Part I.A 
for further discussion of these tests. 
141. See Yeo, 1997 WL 292173, at *27 (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
142. See id. (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
143. See id. (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
144. Id. (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
145. See id. (Lynch, J., dissenting). The dissent also noted that no symbiotic or 
mutually beneficial relationship existed between the publications and the school. See 
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The dissent next addressed whether the context in which the 
students caused the alleged constitutional violation would establish 
state action. Judge Lynch noted that although the students made 
their decision in a public setting-as public students at a public high 
school on public grounds-they had taken on private roles as stu­
dent editors.146 As such, their actions were similar to those of the 
public defender in the case of Polk County v. Dodson who had 
taken on a private function when she acted as counsel to her cli­
ent.147 In Dodson, the Court held that the public defender was not 
a state actor, even though she was considered a state actor when 
performing other duties, such as when making hiring decisions, 
since her duties to her client were akin to those of a private attor­
ney.148 Likewise, the dissent in Yeo noted that the students took on 
the duties of a private editor. For example, the students were in­
dependent of school officials, and at times maintained an adver­
sarial relationship with them.149 Accordingly, the dissent concluded 
that because the record established that the student editors made 
independent editorial judgments, no state action existed.150 
D. United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, En Banc 
The en banc court reversed the three judge panel and affirmed 
the district court's holding that no state action existed; as a result, 
the case was dismissed.151 Judge Lynch, writing for a unanimous 
court, expanded the argument previously made in dissent. 
Although no judge filed a dissenting opinion,152 Judge Stahl, who 
id. (Lynch, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that "it is difficult ... to discern what 
mutual benefits might arise from the students' decision not to run Yeo's ads." Id. 
(Lynch, J., dissenting). 
146. See id. at *28 (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
147. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 324-25 (1981). In Dodson, an 
Iowa prisoner brought a pro se claim against, among others, an attorney in the Offender 
Advocate's Office claiming that his civil rights were violated when the public defender 
moved to withdraw as his counsel on the ground that his claims were legally frivolous. 
See id. at 314. The Supreme Court held, in relevant part, that the public defender "did 
not act under color of state law in exercising her independent professional judgment in 
a [state] criminal proceeding." Id. at 324. 
148. See Dodson, 454 U.S. at 324-25. 
149. See Yeo, 1997 WL 292173, at *29 (Lynch, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed 
out that, in fact, the school officials would have made a different decision. See id. 
(Lynch, J., dissenting). 
150. See id. (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
151. Yeo v. Town of Lexington, 131 F.3d 241, 243 (1st Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 118 S. Ct. 2060 (1998). 
152. Although no judge technically filed a dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Tor­
ruella's concurring opinion insisted that the en banc court mistakenly failed to address 
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had written the panel majority opinion, wrote a concurring opinion 
in which he concurred in the result, but continued to disagree with 
Judge Lynch's state action analysis. Thus, in addition to summariz­
ing Judge Lynch's majority opinion, the following section will ex­
plain Judge Stahl's continuing disagreements with the majority 
VIew. 
1. The Majority Opinion 
Judge Lynch began her analysis by distinguishing the facts of 
Yeo as meaningfully different than the leading Supreme Court cases 
on high school student speech.153 Moreover, she noted that other 
circuit courts which have addressed the closest analogues-in­
dependent college studentedltors-did not find state action.154 
Thus, in framing the analysis for the novel set of facts in Yeo, 
Judge Lynch approached the state action inquiry by outlining three 
issues for analysis:155 the first was whether the state, through the 
school officials, was affirmatively involved, either directly or co­
vertly, in rejecting Yeo's ad;156 the second was whether the school's 
failure to prevent the challenged conduct constituted state action;157 
and the third was whether the students' independent acts were 
fairly attributable to the school officials.15s 
Regarding the first inquiry, Judge Lynch noted that whether 
any direct state involvement existed was primarily a factual ques­
tion, and the record did not support any direct state involvement.159 
She noted that there were indirect, more subtle ways that the school 
might have played a role in the decision-making process, either 
through a symbiotic relationship or by taking on a traditional public 
function.160 However, evidence of a symbiotic relationship was in-
the "important issue" of "the absence of a public forum" with respect to the students' 
publications. Id. (Torruella, J., concurring). Yet, for the court to have addressed that 
issue, it would have first had to find state action and thereafter address the merits of 
Douglas Yeo's First Amendment claim. Thus, it appears as if Judge Torruella is implic­
itly dissenting from the state action issue. 
153. See id. at 250. See supra note 139 for an explanation of those cases. 
154. See Yeo, 131 F.3d at 251. See supra note 86 for citations to these analogous 
cases. 
155. See Yeo, 131 F.3d at 251. 
156. See id. 
157. See id. 
158. See id. 
159. See id. at 251-52. 
160. See id. at 252. Judge Lynch also noted that the facts do not support the claim 
that the school was the "real actor" behind the scenes, nor that it was involved in some 
kind of "charade designed to evade constitutional prohibitions." Id. 
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sufficient for constituting state action since "there [was] no evi­
dence the school officials tacitly endorsed or benefitted from the 
students' decisions."161 Moreover, publishing a student newspaper 
and yearbook "is most emphatically not a traditional function nor 
an exclusive prerogative of the government in this country."162 
Thus, the state had neither a direct, nor a tacit affirmative involve­
ment in the challenged activity. 
Second, Judge Lynch considered whether the school's inaction 
constituted state action. For inaction to constitute state action, 
school officials must have an affirmative duty to prevent the chal­
lenged conduct.163 While recognizing that state statutes are not de­
terminative of the outcome of a federal constitutional question, 
Judge Lynch noted that the relevant Massachusetts statute, which 
prohibits school officials from censoring students, did not require 
the state to act affirmatively in instances such as the one in this 
case.164 Thus, without an affirmative duty to act, the school's acqui­
escence did not constitute state action.165 
Finally, Judge Lynch addressed what she termed the "key is­
sue," namely, whether the students' independent conduct "may be 
fairly attributable to the state."166 In making this determination, 
she applied the nexus test factors.167 Judge Lynch first noted that 
the nexus between "state regulation and financial support of the 
pUblications and the challenged decisions militates against a state 
action finding."168 Under the facts of Yeo, Judge Lynch found that 
although each publication received some financial support, there 
was "no interplay between the decision not to publish the advertise­
161. Id. 
162. Id. 
163. See id. 
164. See id. at 253. 
165. Only rarely would the state have a duty to intervene to prevent a private 
actor from doing harm. For example, "state officials could not personally stand by and 
watch privately-contracted-for prison guards beat a prisoner to death, and then defend 
on the ground of no state action." Id. at 252 n.11; see also Ponce v. Basketball Fed'n of 
Puerto Rico, 760 F.2d 375, 378-80 (1st Cir. 1985) (holding that some occasions exist 
where "[t]he government should be responsible for failing to act where it should act," 
but in the case at bar no state action existed because the government had no affirmative 
duty to regulate amateur sports leagues); cf. DeShaney v. Wmnebago County Dep't of 
Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989) (finding that the Due Process Clause imposes no 
affirmative duty on the government to protect citizens from deprivation of life, liberty, 
or property by private actors). 
166. Yeo, 131 F.3d at 253. 
167. See id. See supra Part LA.1 for a discussion of the nexus factors. 
168. Yeo, 131 F.3d at 253. 
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ment and the state's provision of financial and faculty support."169 
Moreover, reiterating an argument she made in her previous 
panel dissent, Judge Lynch added that the state action question 
"may shift depending on the context and the question asked."170 
Although the students made decisions in the context of a public 
school setting, in assuming their duties as editors, they had taken on 
a private role much like the public defender in Polk County v. Dod­
sonl71 when she assumed the role of a private attorney in perform­
ing her duties as counsel for her client. l72 The students' role as 
independent editors, therefore, mitigated against finding state 
action. 
Thus, because the record established that the student editors 
made independent editorial decisions, and that these decisions 
could not be fairly attributed to the school, the court held that no 
state action existed and dismissed Yeo's suit.173 
2. Judge Stahl's Concurrence 
Judge Stahl concurred with the majority's result, but for differ­
ent reasons. Judge Stahl found the majority's state action ruling "to 
be wrong on the merits."174 He asserted that the students were 
169. Id. at 254. 
170. Id. 
171. 454 U.S. 312 (1981). 
172. See Yeo, 131 F.3d at 254. In Dodson, the public defender was not a state 
actor when she represented a criminal defendant since, in that context, her role (and 
relationship with the state) was the same as that of any private attorney's, even though 
she was considered a state actor when performing other duties, such as when making 
hiring decisions. See Dodson, 454 U.S. at 324-25. Judge Lynch noted the following: 
Even acknowledging that the public defender is a state employee, [Dodson] 
considered it important that, in the actual function of defending the client, the 
public defender's relationship to the state was necessarily independent, and 
even adversarial, and that the defender exercised independent judgment in the 
same manner as did attorneys in the private sector. So too here. 
Yeo, 131 F.3d at 254 (footnote and citations omitted). 
Likewise, Judge Lynch noted that the students in the case at bar were not state 
actors in their role as editors acting independently of the school, even though one could 
identify other contexts where they may be state actors. See id. 
173. See Yeo, 131 F.3d at 255. 
174. Id. at 256 (Stahl, J., concurring). Judge Stahl asserted that the case should 
have been dismissed on statutory grounds because the defendants-Lexington High 
School officials-did not, pursuant to 42 U.S.c. § 1983, "ultimately cause the conduct of 
the non-party students," who rejected Yeo's ad. Id. (Stahl, J., concurring). See supra 
note 7 for the text of 42 U.S.c. § 1983. To prove this causal element of a § 1983 claim, 
the plaintiff Yeo would have had to show that either one individual defendant "actually 
colluded with the students" in their decision to reject the ad, or that the ad was rejected 
pursuant to the Town of Lexington's policy or custom. Yeo, 131 F.3d at 256 (Stahl, J., 
concurring). Insufficient evidence existed, noted Judge Stahl, to show either type of 
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public, not private, actors "insofar as they solicited and published 
advertisements from paying third partes. "175 
Although Judge Stahl abandoned his use of the Hazelwood 
"imprimatur test,"176 he resurrected another position he had used 
in his previous majority panel opinion.177 The student editors 
should be viewed as public actors, he asserted, "when they act as 
representatives of public school publications that bear the imprima­
tur of the school and are disseminated to the public as suCh."178 
More specifically, he noted that the students were public actors in 
their role as officials of the school newspaper in soliciting funds for 
it.179 
Thus, according to Judge Stahl, the majority overlooked the 
preliminary question of whether the students were private or public 
actors.180 He stated that the majority incorrectly relied on cases 
that "presume[ d] that the actor [was] private. "181 These cases be­
gan the state action analysis by asking whether the private actor's 
action may be fairly attributable to the state instead of asking the 
antecedent question of whether the person or entity is a private or 
public actor.182 As a preliminary matter, then, Judge Stahl asserted 
that the state action inquiry must begin with the question of 
"whether the conduct was ... public or private."183 
causation. See id. (Stahl, J., concurring). As such, Stahl reasoned that the majority's 
state action ruling was a violation of judicial restraint because the court inappropriately 
reached a constitutional question of state action" 'in advance of the necessity of decid­
ing [it].'" Id. (Stahl, J., concurring) (quoting Three Affiliated Tribes v. World Eng'g, 
P.e., 467 U.S. 138, 157 (1984)). But see id. at 249 n.3 (noting that Judge Stahl's sugges­
tion is an "unusual approach" since the Supreme Court has "consistently addressed the 
state action question before addressing questions of causation"). 
175. Yeo, 131 F.3d at 257 (Stahl, J., concurring). 
176. See supra Part II.e.1 for an explanation of this argument. 
177. See Yeo v. Town of Lexington, No. 96-1623, 1997 WL 292173, at *7 (1st Cir. 
June 6, 1997), rev'd en bane, 131 F.3d 241 (1st Cir. 1997), eert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2060 
(1998). 
178. Id. 
179. See id. 
180. See Yeo, 131 F.3d at 257 (Stahl, J., concurring) (noting that "[w]hether a 
person or entity is a private or a public actor obviously cannot be resolved through 
application of cases which presume that the actor is private"). 
181. Id. (Stahl, J., concurring). 
182. See id. (Stahl, J., concurring). 
183. Id. (Stahl, J., concurring). As an illustration, Judge Stahl noted that if an on­
duty municipal police officer misuses his power to carry out a personal vendetta, the 
state action analysis would focus on whether his actions were solely private or were 
made possible by virtue of power of state law and because the officer "is clothed with 
the authority of state law." Id. at 258 (Stahl, J., concurring) (citing Martinez v. Colon, 
54 F.3d 980, 986 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding no state action when on-duty police officer, 
assailant, at time and place in question, was engaged in clearly personal pursuit, and 
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The appropriate criteria for determining whether the students 
were public or private actors, Judge Stahl noted, may be found in 
Polk County v. Dodson.l84 In Dodson, the Court used two criteria 
to distinguish between the public defender's private and public 
roles.185 First, because of a public defender's duty of loyalty to her 
client, she "is not amenable to administrative direction [from the 
state] in the same sense as other employees of the State. "186 Sec­
ond, because state criminal defendants have a constitutional right to 
counsel, "it is the constitutional obligation of the State to respect 
the professional independence of the public defenders whom it en­
gages."187 Thus, a public defender's duty of loyalty and a defend­
ant's right to counsel preclude the public defender from acting on 
behalf of the state, or in a public capacity in her role as the criminal 
defendant's counsel. In that role, therefore, she acted as a private 
actor. 
Applying this analytic framework to the students' activities in 
working for the newspaper and yearbook, Judge Stahl concluded 
that the students performed a public function "insofar as they solic­
ited and published [or declined to publish] advertisements from 
paying third parties."188 He reasoned that the students' commercial 
function is a public role and not a private one because there is 
neither a duty of loyalty to a third party that would preclude super­
visory direction, nor a constitutional obligation of the state to re­
spect the students' commercial judgment,189 Although the students 
as editors and publishers were performing private functions, Judge 
Stahl stated that "to the extent public school students solicit funds 
to support a public enterprise in their capacities as officials of that 
was not acting under color of state law, precluding a § 1983 substantive due process 
claim)). Likewise, Judge Stahl insisted that determining whether the students are pub­
lic or private actors requires criteria other than those that determine whether the stu­
dents' acts may be attributed to the Town. Criteria are needed to determine whether 
the students themselves are public or private actors. See id. (Stahl, J.,concurring). 
184. See id. (Stahl, J., concurring). In Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 
(1981), the Supreme Court used a "functional test" when it held that a public defender 
does not act under color of law "when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as 
counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding." Id. at 325. The Court found that the 
public defender's function in this role was a private, not a public function, as opposed to 
when she was making hiring and firing decisions on behalf of the state. See id. See 
supra note 147 for the facts of Dodson. 
185. See Dodson, 454 U.S. at 321-22. 
186. Id. at 321. 
187. Id. at 321-22. 
188. Yeo, 131 F.3d at 257 (Stahl, J., concurring). 
189. See id. at 258 (Stahl, J., concurring). 
215 1999] STUDENT EDITORS AS STATE ACTORS 
enterprise, they act under color of State law."190 Thus, Judge Stahl 
utilized Dodson's functional analysis against the reasoning of the 
majority by asserting that although the students did perform private 
functions, they performed a public one as well, and that should 
have been sufficient for finding state action.191 
III. EQUAL CONSIDERATION FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
In Yeo v. Town of Lexington, the United States Court of Ap­
peals for the First Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the students' 
decision to reject the ad was not state action. since there was an 
insufficient nexus between the school and the students' decision.192 
Yet, the court noted that under the same set of facts, state action 
would have been found if the students' decision had been to ex­
clude someone from their editorial board on account of race.193 
The First Circuit would have ruled differently in a race discrimina­
tion case because in Yeo it endorsed the variable state action analy­
SiS,194 applying a heightened state action standard to an alleged 
First Amendment violation and a more liberal standard to an al­
leged race discrimination violation. 
This Part of the Note will critically analyze the court's use of 
this variable state action analysis in Yeo v. Town of Lexington. 
First, it will demonstrate how the majority applied the sequential 
approach's heightened standard in its state action analysis of the 
alleged First Amendment violation.195 Second, this Part examines 
I· 
190. Id. at 259 (Stahl, J., concurring). In fact, Judge Stahl stated that "the power 
of school officials to regulate the content of student publications and the acts of their 
student editors ... is near its apex where the subject of the regulation involves the 
students' commercial interactions with third parties." Id. at 258. (Stahl, J., concurring) 
(citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 u.S. 260, 266-70 (1988». 
191. See id. (Stahl, J., concurring). The majority dismissed, out of hand, Judge 
Stahl's argument for distinguishing the students as acting privately in their role of re­
porting and publicly in their role of making advertisement decisions. See id. at 250 n.7. 
192. See id. at 255. 
193. See id. at 254 n.15. Judge Lynch wrote the following: 
[I]f this were a claim brought by a student who had been excluded from elec­
tion to the editorial board [of the newspaper] on account of her race, and the 
school officials [had] declined to intervene, the analysis would focus on Ii dif­
ferent decision and most likely would reach a different result. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
194. As previously stated, variable state action analysis keys different state action 
standards to the type of constitutional right at stake, applying a heightened standard to 
First Amendment cases and a liberal standard to race discrimination cases. As a practi­
cal matter, then, courts will dismiss more alleged First Amendment violations by private 
persons. See supra Part I.A.5 for further discussion of variable state action analysis. 
195. See supra Part 1.A.3 for a discussion of the sequential approach. 
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the majority's use of this heightened state action standard by chal­
lenging its acceptance of the variable state action approach. This 
Part will suggest that the variable state action approach undermines 
judicial accountability and fails to give equal consideration to all 
alleged fundamental rights violations.196 Third, this Part suggests 
that courts should use what will be termed an "Equal Consideration 
Approach" to state action analysis; they should apply the same 
state action standard-the more liberal totality approach-to all al­
leged fundamental rights violations. Finally, this Part will suggest 
that, under the facts of Yeo, applying the more liberal totality ap­
proach would support a finding of state action.197 As such, the 
Note concludes, the First Circuit in Yeo should have decided Doug­
las Yeo's First Amendment complaint on the merits. 
A. The Majority's Use of the Sequential Approach 
With the sequential approach, a court finds state action by ex­
amining each nexus factor in isolation to determine if, by itself, it is 
sufficient to turn private conduct into state action.198 Judge Lynch, 
in her majority opinion in Yeo, found no state action after she dis­
posed of three theories for finding state action.199 She first ana­
lyzed whether the school actually made or controlled the editorial 
decisions, and she found it did not control them since the record did 
not indicate otherwise. zoo Second, she dismissed the claim that the 
school's inaction constituted state action since the school had no 
affirmative duty to act.Z01 Finally, Judge Lynch used the nexus anal­
ysis to determine whether the students' independent acts could be 
fairly attributed to the school.2°Z It was pursuant to this third the­
ory, the nexus analysis, that Judge Lynch used the sequential ap­
196. See infra Part III.B.1 for a discussion of these arguments. 
197. See supra Part 1.A.2 for a discussion of the totality approach. 
198. Recall that nexus factors include: a state compelling, encouraging, or assist­
ing the private person's challenged conduct; or, a private person's conduct having suffi­
cient contacts with the state vis-a-vis regulations, mutual benefits (symbiotic 
relationship) or direct or special funding. See supra Part 1.A.1 for further discussion of 
the nexus factors. 
199. See Yeo v. Town of Lexington, 131 F.3d 241, 251 (1st Cir. 1997) (en banc), 
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2060 (1998). For a further discussion of Yeo, see supra Part 
II.D.l. 
200. See Yeo, 131 F.3d at 251-52. 
201. See id. at 252-53. Judge Lynch also squashed the suggestion that an affirma­
tive duty might derive from the existence of a "symbiotic relationship" between the 
publication and the school, or from a traditional government function of running a 
school. See id. at 253. 
202. See id. 
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proach associated with variable state action analysis.203 
In performing her nexus analysis, Judge Lynch analyzed nexus 
factors in isolation, dismissing each one when it alone was insuffi­
cient to implicate state action. For example, first she analyzed 
whether state regulation of the students' activities was sufficient to 
find state action.204 Next she analyzed whether state subsidy of the 
students' publications rose to a sufficient level to find state ac­
tion.205 She concluded that each nexus factor, by itself, was insuffi­
203. In fact, Judge Lynch prefaces her state action analysis by first defending the 
variable state action thesis. For example, she writes the following: 
The modem state action decisions of the Supreme Court do not rely on a 
single analytic model applied regardless of the fact patterns involved .... The 
analytic model used must take account of the specific constitutional claim being 
asserted, here, one under the First Amendment. Cf. Polk County v. Dodson, 
454 U.S. 312, 324-25 (1981) (state action inquiry shifts depending on constitu­
tional question asked). "Faithful adherence to the 'state action' requirement 
... requires careful attention to the gravamen of the plaintiffs complaint." 
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1003 (1982). 
Yeo, 131 F.3d at 249 (emphasis added) (parallel citations omitted). 
Judge Lynch's Supreme Court citations, however, do not support this approach. 
First, regarding Polk County v. Dodson, the state action question shifts, as Judge Lynch 
herself admitted, not based on the content of the complaint but based on the defend­
ant's role in the context of the complaint. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying 
text. Second, and more importantly, her quote from Blum, when placed in its context, 
does not mean, as Judge Lynch suggested, that a court must look to the plaintiffs com­
plaint and identify the constitutional claim prior to its state action analysis. Instead, the 
Court in Blum looked to the plaintiffs complaint to determine if the challenged action 
attached to state regulations or procedures or whether it attached solely to a private 
person's decision. See Blum, 457 U.S. at 1003. This determination will change the focus 
of the state action analysis because state action is more easily identified in the former 
than in the latter case. Importantly, in Blum, the Court did not find that state action 
analysis begins by looking to the plaintiffs complaint to identify the constitutional claim 
at stake. As discussed supra note 76, the Supreme Court has not ruled on whether 
courts should key their state action analysis to the constitutional claim at stake. The 
following passage from Blum contains Lynch's quote and puts it in its proper context. 
Faithful adherence to the "state action" requirement of the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires careful attention to the gravamen of the plaintiffs com­
plaint. In this case, respondents objected to the involuntary discharge or trans­
fer of Medicaid patients by their nursing homes without certain procedural 
safeguards.... They have named as defendants state officials responsible for 
administering the Medicaid program in New York. These officials are also 
responsible for regulating nursing homes in the State, including those in which 
respondents were receiving care. But respondents are not challenging particu­
lar state regulations or procedures, and their arguments concede that the deci­
sion to discharge or transfer a patient originates not with state officials, but 
with nursing homes that are privately owned and operated. Their lawsuit, 
therefore, seeks to hold state officials liable for the actions ofprivate parties . ... 
Blum, 457 U.S. at 1003. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
204. See Yeo, 131 F.3d at 254. 
205. See id. 
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cient because the extent of each alone was de minimis.206 
Importantly, however, Judge Lynch acknowledged that the 
above factors, together with numerous other nexus factors, "sup­
port[ed] Yeo's argument" for state action.207 For example, she 
noted that the Yearbook centered on a public high school class, and 
the newspaper was named Lexington High School Musket.208 She 
also noted that besides state subsidies supporting the publications, 
public school officials advised the students in producing these publi­
cations. Moreover, the "newspaper exist[ ed] in the form it did be­
cause the school authorities and state law permit[ted] it to do 
so."209 In addition, Judge Lynch noted that the publications pro­
vided "explicit educational value" and credentials for the students, 
achieved educational goals for the school, and that the students 
worked on these publications on school grounds and sometimes 
during school hours.210 
But Judge Lynch dismissed these other nexus factors, which to­
gether appeared to support state action, as irrelevant given the con­
text in which the students made their decision.211 According to 
Judge Lynch, the" 'nexus' argument turns on context," and the stu­
dents had taken on private roles within the context of their public 
setting.212 They did so, she noted, in the same way as a public de­
fender does when she assumes her role as counsel to her client.213 
In such a case, the Supreme Court has held that the public de­
fender's actions are no longer attributable to the state.214 
We can distinguish, however, the case of a public defender as­
suming a private role in her duties as public counsel, and the logic 
behind it, from the situation presented in Yeo. The Supreme Court 
held that a public defender's decisions are not attributable to the 
state because "it is the constitutional obligation of the State to re­
spect the professional independence of the public defenders whom 
206. See id. Here, Judge Lynch cites Rendell·Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840 
(1982), for the point that even extensive funding is insufficient by itself to find state 
action. See Yeo, 131 F.3d at 253. 
207. Yeo, 131 F.3d at 254. 
208. See id. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. 
211. See id. 
212. Id. 
213. See id. 
214. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 324-25 (1981). See supra note 147 
and accompanying text for further discussion of Dodson. 
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it engages."215 However, the State has no constitutional obligation 
to respect the independence of student decisions regarding school 
publications.216 Additionally, unlike a public defender, a student 
has no strict duty of loyalty to a third person such as a client.217 As 
such, the analogy between the students' actions in Yeo and a public 
defender's is misplaced since the students' actions are neither con­
stitutionally protected nor ethically required.218 Judge Lynch, then, 
inappropriately relied on the public defender analogy to avoid nu­
merous nexus indicia that together appeared to support state ac­
tion.219 Thus, to deny state action, Judge Lynch avoided using the 
more liberal state action standard associated with the totality ap­
proach and instead embraced a heightened state action standard as­
sociated with the sequential approach.220 
B. 	 Problems with Using Variable State Action Analysis: 
Should Finding State Action Be More Difficult in 
First Amendment Cases than in Racial 
Discrimination Cases? 
The majority in Yeo used the sequential approach's heightened 
state action standard to conclude that no state action existed.221 
But it conceded that had the constitutional right at stake been one 
of racial discrimination, instead of the First Amendment, it would 
have likely found state action.222 In racial discrimination cases, 
courts have primarily used the liberal state action standard associ­
215. 	 Dodson, 454 U.S. at 321-22. 
216. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,266-70 (1988) (holding 
that school officials may delete articles from student newspapers). 
217. See Dodson, 454 U.S. at 321 (holding that, in part, a public defender's duty 
of loyalty to her client makes her actions not amenable to administrative direction from 
the state because that duty requires strict allegiance to her client). 
218. Cf. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 51 (1988) (finding state action where a pri­
vate doctor contracted with the state to provide medical care in a prison because, unlike 
a public defender, a doctor's "professional and ethical obligation to make independent 
medical judgments [do] not set him in conflict with the State and other prison 
authorities"). 
219. Judge Lynch noted that given these factors "[i]t is a close question whether 
the injury caused here is aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of government 
authority." Yeo v. Town of Lexington, 131 F.3d 241, 254 (1st Cir. 1997) (en banc) 
(citing Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614,622 (1991», cert. denied, 118 
S. Ct. 2060 (1998). 
220. See supra Part I.A.5 and citations therein for a discussion of varying state 
action standards and their associated constitutional claims. 
221. 	 See supra Part III.A for further explanation. 
222. 	 See supra note 193 for Judge Lynch's statement that supports this claim. 
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ated with the totality approach.223 In Yeo, the First Circuit chose to 
use a heightened state action standard to address Yeo's First 
Amendment claim because it embraced a variable state action ap­
proach, keying state action standards to the offensiveness of the al­
leged constitutional violation.224 
Should courts vary the state action analysis based on the con­
stitutional violation alleged? To defend this practice would require 
courts to rank fundamental constitutional rights in a hierarchy of 
importance for purposes of reaching the merits.225 Under this ap­
proach, courts would decide that someone who has been racially 
discriminated against ought to have a better chance of having his or 
her day in court than someone whose speech has been suppressed. 
The alternative would be for courts to apply the same state action 
standard to all fundamental constitutional rights.226 
1. Problems with the Variable State Action Approach 
Some courts have found that ranking fundamental constitu­
tional rights is inappropriate for state action analysis.227 These 
223. See supra Part 1.A.5 for a discussion of the use of a liberal state action stan­
dard for race discrimination cases. 
224. See Yeo, 131 F.3d. at 249 & n.6. 
225. Recall that the issue here is whether one can overcome the threshold test of 
state action to prevent the court from dismissing the case before it reaches the constitu­
tional merits. Thus, even though the courts treat First Amendment rights and rights 
against racial discrimination as fundamental, by making it easier to dismiss free speech 
rights courts implicitly rank them lower, and find them to be less protected, than rights 
against race discrimination. This difference in ranking is not self-evident. In fact, the 
reverse may be true since protecting free speech provides the very groundwork for a 
society of laws within which people can argue for and defend racial equality. 
226. A right is fundamental when it is "so rooted in the traditions and conscience 
of our people" that fair and enlightened system of justice would not be possible without 
it. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934); accord Washington v. Glucksburg, 
521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (determining a fundamental right by looking at whether the 
right is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition"). 
227. See Isaacs v. Board of Trustees of Temple Univ., 385 F. Supp. 473, 485 (E.D. 
Pa. 1974). Judge Higginbotham wrote the following: 
Often, it would seem, courts have been influenced in their determinations of 
the preliminary, jurisdictional question-whether "state action" exists-by the 
particular invidiousness of the constitutional violation alleged. When viewed 
in this context, defendants[ ] ... implicitly suggest[ ] that courts generally, and 
this Court in particular, should be more reluctant to find "state action" in 
cases which do not involve racial discrimination. I decline to accept that sug­
gestion. It is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to arrange federal constitu­
tional rights in an ascending hierarchy of value. What is clear is that any 
deprivation of such a right, whether to the equal protection of the laws as 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment or to the freedoms of speech and 
association as guaranteed by the First Amendment, is a matter of extreme im­
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courts have asserted that because the Supreme Court has deemed a 
right fundamental, courts should treat any alleged violation of that 
right with an equal level of state action inquiry.228 In other words, 
whether one asserts a right against discrimination or a right to free 
speech, the courts have recognized that in either case the assertion 
is extremely important to the person suffering the deprivation, and 
courts should be equally sensitive to such deprivations.229 
Courts have also asserted that variable analysis allows judges 
to rank fundamental constitutional values without adequate justifi­
cation.230 That is, a court will assign a particular state action stan­
portance to the person who suffers the deprivation. It is equally clear that the 
courts should be especially sensitive to any such deprivation, whether it in­
volves a black man who is refused service in a segregated restaurant, ... or 
two faculty members who were fired for speaking their minds about a univer­
sity's publication policies, as is purportedly the case here. The freedoms of 
speech and association have been held so fundamental to the concept ofordered 
liberty that they have been incorporated into the Due Process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 u.S. 229 (1963). 
Clearly, then, the courts should be alert to their infringement "under color of' 
state law, and quick to vindicate them if they have in fact been curtailed. 
Id. at 485 n.ll (emphasis added); see also Parks v. "Mr. Ford," 556 F.2d 132, 154 (3d 
Cir. 1977) (Gibbons, J., concurring); Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 524 F.2d 818, 823 
n.7 (7th Cir. 1975); Stern v. Massachusetts Indem. & Life Ins. Co., 365 F. Supp. 433, 439 
(E.D. Pa. 1973); Keller v. Kate Maremount Found., 365 F. Supp. 798, 801 (N.D. Cal. 
1972), affd sub nom. Geneva Towers Tenants Org. v. Federated Mortgage Investors, 
504 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1974); Seidenberg v. McSorleys' Old Ale House, Inc., 317 F. 
Supp. 593, 598 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit questioned the continued validity of its variable analysis approach. 
See Albert v. Carovano, 851 F.2d 561, 570-74 (2d Cir. 1988) (en banc); see also Tavoloni 
v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 984 F. Supp. 196,204 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
228. See Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1, 6 n.5 (1st Cir. 1978); Isaacs, 385 F. Supp. 
at 485 n.ll; see also Jakosa, supra note 77, at 194 (criticizing the variable state action 
approach as "artificial and unjust"). 
In fact, the First Circuit itself has rejected this variable state action approach when 
applied to fundamental rights. See Downs, 574 F.2d at 7 n.5 (noting that even if the 
court were to adopt the Second Circuit's "flexible approach to state action analysis" it 
would "be inclined to group infringements of fundamental rights and racial discrimina­
tion together"); see also Lamb v Rantoul, 561 F.2d 409, 411 (1st Cir. 1977) (expressing 
reservations over using the variable state action approach); cf. Fletcher v. Rhode Island 
Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, 496 F.2d 927, 931 (1st Cir. 1974) (applying a heightened state 
action standard in an economic due process case where a depositor claimed that a bank 
violated her due process rights when it used without notice the plaintiffs checking ac­
count deposits to setoff her bank credit card debt). See infra Part III.C for further 
discussion of the First Circuit's approach. 
229. See Isaacs, 385 F. Supp. at 485 n.ll. 
230. See Parks, 556 F.2d at 154. Writing in concurrence, Judge Gibbons criticized 
this masking of judicial reasoning: 
The result of [the] adoption [of variable state action analysis] would be to 
hinge the availability of the national law applicable to the states by virtue of 
the fourteenth amendment not on the relationship between the actor and the 
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dard based on the constitutional violation alleged and then apply 
that standard without ever having to articulate why it assigned more 
or less importance to the constitutional value at issue.231 
If a court is to treat free speech with less importance than ra­
cial equality, the court ought to "articulate [its] reasons for tilting 
the scale one way or the other."232 In failing to provide such rea­
sons, courts silently rule on the relative value of fundamental rights, 
which undermines judicial accountability.233 
2. A Balancing Approach to State Action Analysis? 
To overcome the lack of judicial accountability associated with 
the variable state action doctrine, some authorities argue for jet­
tisoning the state action requirement and instead balancing the sub­
stantive interests of the parties up front.234 Under this approach, a 
state but on a prejudgment by the judge, state or federal, of the importance of 
the rights being claimed on his subjective scale of constitutional values. It is 
true, of course, that in discussing the merits of claims for constitutional protec­
tion we make evaluations of the relative worth of competing claims of the 
opposing party and of society. But when we do so on the merits we are forced 
to articulate our reasons for tilting the scale one way or the other. By the device 
of a "non-decision," turning the result on the absence of state action in a par­
ticular context, a judge makes subjective social policy decisions without expos­
ing those reasons. 
Id. (Gibbons, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
231. The problem of not providing judicial reasons for assigning lesser impor­
tance to First Amendment rights is especially troubling in the case of Yeo. Yeo's First 
Amendment complaint rested on the argument that the high school newspaper and 
yearbook were limited public forums, which would trigger the court's use of strict scru­
tiny analysis to Yeo's claim because the advertising ban was based on the content of his 
ad. See Yeo v. Town of Lexington, No. 96-1623, 1997 WL 292173, at *16 (1st Clr. June 
6,1997), rev'd en bane, 131 F.3d 241 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2060 (1998). 
By dismissing the case, the court never analyzed the important and difficult First 
Amendment question of whether the high school publications were public or non-pub­
lic forums. In fact, the panel decision is proof that this question is not so easily re­
solved. See id. at *9, *29; see also Yeo, 131 F.3d at 255 (Torruella, J., concurring) 
(emphasizing the importance of discussing the public forum issue). 
232. Parks, 556 F.2d at 154. 
233. The value of judicial accountability derives from the value that our legal sys­
tem places on deliberating (reasoning) about legal rights. This value of deliberation is 
respected only if courts leave a record of their reasons, which other courts can decide 
either to follow, because they agree with the reasoning, or to overrule, because they 
find the reasoning mistaken. A lack of judicial accountability, then, undermines the 
importance of deliberation to the legal system. 
234. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 503, 
540 (1985) (arguing that balancing substantive interests "would force the courts clearly 
to identify and define the conflicting liberties, enhancing understanding of each of the 
rights at stake"); see also Robert J. Glennon, Jr. & John E. Nowak, A Functional Analy­
sis of the Fourteenth Amendment "State Action" Requirement, 1976 SUP. Cr. REv. 221, 
231; NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 3, § 12.5, at 507-09. The Supreme Court has 
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court would resolve the state action question as follows. First, it 
would identify the constitutionally protected interests of the victim. 
Second, it would identify the constitutionally protected interests of 
the actor. Third, the court would balance those interests.235 The 
court's ability to strike this balance rather than find significant state 
involvement would determine the outcome of the state action 
decision.236 
Under the balancing approach, in other words, the state always 
acts, since it chooses to make a change or tolerate the status quo. 
The so-called "state action requirement" is "merely a tool for sepa­
rating out those nongovernmental activities whose existence so im­
pairs certain fundamental values that they are proscribed by the 
Constitution."237 The Constitution, therefore, "does not require 
the judiciary to determine whether a state has 'acted,' but whether a 
never adopted this approach, but some authorities suggest that the Court engages in it 
covertly under the state action rubric. See Esper, supra note 13, at 678; see also 
Chemerinsky, supra, at 540. 
235. See Esper, supra note 13, at 677-78. An alternative formulation would be the 
following: "If the importance of the [complainant's] right is not clearly greater than that 
of the challenged practice, the effect of the practice on the right does not violate the 
[Constitution]." Glennon & Nowak, supra note 234, at 231; cf. Kenneth L. Karst & 
Harold W. Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase ofSubstantive Equal Protection, 
1967 SUP. Cr. REv. 39,75 (defending a more complex balancing approach, which takes 
into account "the value of the objective of the challenged conduct (state or private), the 
seriousness of the impact of that conduct on the constitutionally protected interest in 
equality, and, where pertinent, the availability of alternative means for achieving the 
same objective with a lesser invasion of the interest in equality"). 
236. In fact, although the court in Yeo did not use the balancing approach per se, 
there is evidence that it was balancing First Amendment interests as a prerequisite to its 
state action determination, and that this balancing influenced that determination. For 
example, the court wrote the following: 
There are expressive interests involved on both sides of this case. Yeo's 
are obvious. Those on the other side are perhaps less obvious. The identifica­
tion of these interests puts the state action question in context. 
If the actions by the students are themselves state action or may be attrib­
uted to the school officials and provide the basis for state action, the inevitable 
legal consequence will be some level of judicial scrutiny of the students' edito­
rial judgments. The inevitable practical consequence will be greater official 
control of the students' editorial judgments. Both consequences implicate the 
students' First Amendment interests, which are far from negligible .... In 
addition, the defendant school officials themselves have an interest in their 
autonomy to make educational decisions. The officials have determined that 
the best way to teach journalism skills is to respect in the students' editorial 
judgments a degree of autonomy similar to that exercised by professional jour­
nalists. That choice by the officials parallels the allocation of responsibility for 
editorial judgments made by the First Amendment itself. 
Yeo, 131 F.3d at 249-50 (emphasis added) (citations and footnote omitted). 
237. Glennon & Nowak, supra note 234, at 259. 
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state has 'deprived' someone of a guaranteed right."238 
One advantage of this approach is that it requires judicial ac­
countability by forcing the court to justify how it has balanced im­
portant constitutional values. Instead of masking the reasoning for 
denying state action behind a prearranged hierarchy of rights, a 
court is forced to defend the relative weight it is assigning to a par­
ticular constitutional right as it would if it were analyzing a constitu­
tional claim on its merits.239 
The balancing approach is problematic, however, because it es­
sentially eliminates the state action requirement.24o The approach 
is premised on the idea that all action is state action-either action 
that changes behavior or inaction that tolerates the status quo. 
Such a premise diverges too far from the history and practice of the 
state action doctrine. The traditional state action doctrine assumes 
that a distinction between state and private action is not so blurred 
as to be invisible. Thus, a major flaw in the balancing approach is 
that it goes too far by eliminating a distinction accepted since the 
Civil Rights Cases.241 
C. An Equal Consideration Approach to State Action Analysis 
A better approach to state action analysis would incorporate 
the balancing approach's virtue of requiring judicial accountability, 
while at the same time preserving the state action doctrine. An ap­
proach that would achieve both goals would give equal considera­
tion to all alleged fundamental rights violations by using the more 
liberal totality approach for finding state action. Using this "Equal 
Consideration Approach," courts would preserve the distinction be­
tween state and private action, thereby upholding the state action 
doctrine itself. More importantly, they would preserve the integrity 
of fundamental constitutional rights by facilitating judicial account­
ability for their value and rank. 
Under an "Equal Consideration Approach," courts would ap­
ply the same state action standard to all alleged fundamental consti­
238. Id. at 229. 
239. See Karst & Horowitz, supra note 235, at 75 for a complex balancing ap­
proach that resembles a court's analysiS of a constitutional claim on its merits. 
240. Cf. Esper, supra note 13, at 680-82 (noting other difficulties with the balanc­
ing approach). 
241. 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883) (affirming the essential dichotomy between state and 
private conduct). Moreover, eliminating the state action requirement is also contrary to 
explicit constitutional text. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 ("No State shall ... nor 
shall any State . .." (emphasis added»; U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no 
law ..." (emphasis added». 
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tutional rights violations.242 Accordingly, each claimant's alleged 
constitutional deprivation would receive equal judicial treatment. 
Giving each fundamental constitutional right equal considera­
tion does not mean that each claimant's constitutional interest re­
ceives the same value and rank. When analyzing rights on the 
merits, a court will rule that some interests are more important than 
others; it will balance competing interests as it must in all constitu­
tional decisions on the merits. Receiving equal consideration sim­
ply means that each alleged constitutional rights violation confronts 
the same hurdle before reaching the merits. This approach pro­
vides for equal consideration (a similar state action hurdle) because 
the claimant must overcome the state action hurdle to avoid a dis­
missal. To raise the bar only on some fundamental constitutional 
rights would not sufficiently respect those other constitutional 
claimants and the deprivations they allege.243 
Thus, if the same state action standard should apply to all fun­
damental rights, then finding state action in First Amendment cases 
should not be harder than finding it in racial discrimination cases. 
Moreover, if the totality approach's liberal state action standard 
would have supported a finding of state action in Yeo ,244 then the 
First Circuit should have applied that standard and not dismissed 
the case. 
242. In fact, the First Circuit has supported this approach. See Downs v. Sawtelle, 
574 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1978). After noting his reservations about the Second Circuit's use 
of the variable state action approach, Chief Judge Coffin wrote: "Even were we to 
adopt such an approach, however, we would be inclined to group infringements of fun­
damental rights and racial discrimination together for the purpose of state action analy­
sis just as they receive comparable scrutiny in equal protection cases." Id. at 6 n.5. 
(emphasis added); see also Lavoie v. Bigwood, 457 F.2d 7, 13-15 (1st Cir. 1972) (finding 
that an ejectment action instituted to violate tenant's First Amendment rights by mobile 
home park owner whose monopoly had been created by zoning was an application of 
New Hampshire landlord and tenant statute and amounted to state action even though 
the statute was neutral on its face); cf. Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, 536 F.2d 
1073, 1084 (5th Cir. 1976) (Goldberg, J., dissenting). Writing in dissent, Judge 
Goldberg argued that the two issues (race discrimination and free speech) should, in 
some instance, be treated the same. He writes that a court would no doubt review "a 
decision by the students [of a college run paper] to exclude blacks from participation in 
the newspaper staff as a decision imbued with state action. To my mind the pure 'state 
action' question should be the same in the first amendment context." Mississippi Gay 
Alliance, 536 F.2d at 1085 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). 
243. This claim assumes that receiving sufficient respect requires having an equi­
table opportunity to have one's constitutional rights addressed on the merits. 
244. See infra Part III.D for an application of the totality standard to the facts of 
Yeo. 
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D. 	 Applying the Equal Consideration Approach to the Facts 
o/Yeo 
The Equal Consideration Approach recommends that courts 
apply the. same state action standard to all fundamental constitu­
tional rights. That standard, this Note assumes, could be the more 
liberal standard associated with the totality approach, which courts 
apply in race discrimination cases. This final section will apply that 
standard to the facts of Yeo and suggest that the First Circuit could 
have found state action under the totality approach. 
Unlike the sequential approach, the totality approach does not 
look at each nexus factor in isolation and then dismiss completely 
its possible contribution to the aggregate. Instead, under the total­
ity approach, courts consider each nexus factor together with the 
others and analyze whether, in the aggregate, they constitute state 
action.245 Given the number of nexus indicia present in the context 
of the students' ed.itorial decision, this section will apply the totality 
approach to the facts of Yeo and argue that under such an analysis 
state action existed. 
The relevant factors in Yeo, which analyzed in the aggregate 
would support a finding of state action, are the following: (1) the 
Musket and the Yearbook were official public high school publica­
tions used to represent the school;246 (2) public high school students 
produced the pUblications; (3) the public perceived that the publica­
tions bore the imprimatur of the public school;247 (4) a state law 
provided students with decisional authority;248 (5) state officials su­
pervised the students and received extra compensation for those re­
sponsibilities;249 (6) the high school principal controlled the bank 
245. 	 See supra Part I.A.2 for further discussion of the totality approach. 
246. See Fortin v. Darlington Little League, Inc., 514 F.2d 344, 347 (1st Cir. 1975) 
(finding state action, where a private baseball little league denied a ten year-old girl the 
right to play based on her gender, because, in part, the little league's use of the city-kept 
baseball diamonds "undoubtedly took on in the public consciousness a semi-official 
character, little different from recreational programs under direct City sponsorship"). 
247. See Yeo v. Town of Lexington, No. 96-1623, 1997 WL 292173, at *6 (1st Cir. 
June 6, 1997), rev'd en bane, 131 F.3d 241 (1st Cir. 1997), eert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2060 
(1998); see also Falzarazo v. United States, 607 F.2d 506, 511 (1st Cir. 1979) (finding no 
state action, where tenants of a federally subsidized housing project sued their land­
lords, because "[t]he badge of 'public entity' cannot be fairly attached to [the housing 
projects]"). 
248. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 82 (1996). See supra note 112 for the text of 
the statute. Originally the statute was elective, but on July 14, 1988, "in response to the 
[Hazelwood] decision, the Massachusetts legislature made the provision mandatory." 
Abrams & Goodman, supra note 112, at 730 n.l72; see also, Phillips, supra note 112. 
249. 	 The advisors to the Yearbook and the Musket, both Lexington High School 
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checking accounts of both publications;25o (7) the school officials 
retained final authority over the publications and were prepared to 
use it in cases where students wanted to publish obscene mate­
rial;251 (8) both publications received state financial assistance;252 
(9) a mutually beneficial relationship existed between the students 
and the high school;253 (10) the students used state facilities;254 and 
(11) the students represented the school in commercial transactions 
with third parties.255 
In the aggregate, these factors should support a finding of state 
action under the liberal standard of the totality approach. Under 
this approach, recall, no direct or overt government participation is 
required. Instead, to borrow language from Burton v. Wilmington 
Parking Authority,256 "[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing circum­
stances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private con­
duct be attributed its true significance."257 Echoing this language, 
the First Circuit itself has held that "[t]he essence of Burton . .. is 
that the relationship between the state and the private [party] may 
be so intertwined that the state will be held responsible for conduct 
teachers, received about $2,000 and $1,373, respectively. See Yeo v. Town of Lexington, 
131 F.3d 241, 243-44 (1st Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert denied, 118 S. Ct. 2060 (1998). 
250. See Yeo, 1997 WL 292173, at *6. 
251. See id. 
252. See Yeo, 131 F.3d at 243-44. 
253. This relationship existed in two ways. First, the school fulfilled its educa­
tional objectives, and the students received skills and credentials. Second, the students 
funded their publications from money received from the commercial transactions with 
third parties in the town, and the town had the prospect of monetary benefit. See id. at 
258 (Stahl, J., concurring) . 
. .254. The Yearbook used the LHS buildings and facilities; the Musket had a 
mailbox at the school. See id.; see also Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 641 F.2d 14, 23 (1st Cir. 
1981) (noting that the strongest state action factor in Burton v. Wilmington Parking 
Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961), was the use of public property), affd, 457 U.S. 830 
(1982); Fortin v. Darlington Little League, Inc., 514 F.2d 344 (1st Cir. 1975) (relying 
heavily on the use of public property as a factor for finding state action in a sex discrim­
ination case). 
255. See Yeo, 131 F.3d at 259 (Stahl, J., dissenting). 
256. 365 U.S. 715 (1960). 
257. Id. at 722 (emphasis added). A number of courts have used Burton's totality 
approach to analyze alleged First Amendment violations. See Carlin Communications, 
Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co., 827 F.2d 1291, 1298 (9th Cir. 1987); Interna­
tional Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Air Canada, 727 F.2d 253, 254 (2d Cir. 
1984); Foster v. Ripley, 645 F.2d 1142, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Jensen v. Farrell Lines, 
Inc., 625 F.2d 379, 382 (2d Cir. 1980); Reitz v. Persing, 831 F. Supp. 410, 416 (M.D. Pa. 
1993); Pleasant v. Lovell, No. 83-F-2251, 1990 WL 393737, at *7 (D. Colo. Sept. 28, 
1990); Henry v. First Nat'l Bank of Clarksdale, 424 F. Supp. 633, 639 (N.D. Miss. 1976); 
Curtis v. Rosso & Mastracco, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 804, 806 (E.D. Va. 1976); Isaacs v. 
Board of Trustees of Temple Univ., 385 F. Supp. 473, 487-88 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Keller v. 
Kate Maremount Found., 365 F. Supp. 798, 800 (N.D. Cal. 1972). 
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with which it had no direct connection."258 
In a variety of earlier decisions, the First Circuit's state action 
analysis was consistent with this conclusion. For example, in Fortin 
v. Darlington Little League, Inc. ,259 the First Circuit found state ac­
tion in a sex discrimination case by analyzing an expanded set of 
state action indicia. There, a ten-year-old girl was denied a right to 
play little league baseball because of her gender. In finding state 
action, the court went beyond the factors of regulation and financial 
assistance and focused on the private little league's relationship 
with the city. The little league not only used and depended on the 
city-provided baseball diamonds, but the city accommodated the 
league's practice and playing schedule to the virtual exclusion of 
other members of the community.260 As such, the court pointed 
out that this gave the league a "semi-official character" in the public 
consciousness.261 
The First Circuit's analysis of nexus indicia in Lamb v. 
Rantou/262 also supports interpreting the factors in Yeo as sufficient 
for state action under the totality approach. In Lamb, a female 
school teacher at a private postgraduate school-the Rhode Island 
School of Design-alleged sex discrimination when the school de­
nied her tenure. In its denial of state action, the First Circuit identi­
fied a variety of nexus indicia, which it held to be insufficient. The 
indica included the following: (1) the city conveyed a building to the 
school (and the school gave the city an easement in other property 
for historical purposes); (2) the state required five of the forty-three 
school directors to be city officials; (3) the school received some 
government subsidies; (4) the state required the school to' submit 
annual reports; and (5) the school was required to allow the state to 
conduct inspections.263 Importantly, the difference between Lamb 
and Fortin turns on, in part, the use of state facilities and land, and 
the appearance that the entity is official in the public's eye. More­
over, and even more importantly, Lamb declined to apply the more 
liberal totality approach in a sex discrimination case,264 and instead 
relied for its state action analysis on Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison 
258. Rendell-Baker, 641 F.2d at 22 (citing Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1,8-9 (1st 
Cir. 1978» (emphasis added). 
259. 514 F.2d 344 (1st Cir. 1975). 
260. See id. at 347. 
261. See id. 
262. 561 F.2d 409 (1st Cir. 1977). 
263. See id. at 410. 
264. See id. at 411. 
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Co. ,265 which used a heightened state action standard associated 
with the sequential approach. Whether the court should have ap­
plied the totality approach to a sex discrimination case is beyond 
the scope of this Note. However, given that the First Circuit later 
endorsed applying the totality approach to all fundamental 
rights,266 Lamb suggests, anyway, that the number and variety of 
nexus indicia in that case may have been sufficient had it applied 
the liberal approach. That is especially relevant given that in Yeo 
the state action nexus indicia included, among others, the use of 
public land and facilities, and the appearance in the public's eye 
that the publications were official.Z67 
Nevertheless, the number and quality of nexus indicia in Yeo 
implicate all told a sufficient contact with the state to satisfy the 
liberal state action standard defended in this Note. This conclusion 
is not only consistent with prior First Circuit state action analysis, 
but with Judge Lynch's own assessment of the facts.268 Their cumu­
lative impact provides a sufficient nexus between the students' deci­
sions and the school to create state action. The public high school 
students in Yeo depended on the school for the existence of the 
yearbook and the newspaper, and the school itself provided edito­
rial opportunities only to its students. The school needs students to 
generate a yearbook and a newspaper-each playing an important 
265. 419 u.s. 345, 358-59 (1974) (finding no state action when a private utility 
company did not provide due process when it terminated a customer's service). 
266. See Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1, 7 n.5 (1st Cir. 1978) (finding state action 
where }! private community hospital allegedly conspired to sterilize the plaintiff, a deaf 
mute, against her will). 
267. Interestingly, these two factors, use of public property and official appear­
ance, were significant in Fortin, which was also a sex discrimination case. This suggests 
that these factors may be enough even under a stricter state action standard. Cf. 
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 641 F.2d 14, 23 (1st Cir. 1981) (involving the dismissal of a 
teacher at a private high school, where the absence of these two factors played a role in 
the First Circuit denying state action), affd, 457 U.S. 830 (1982). In Falzarano v. United 
States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir. 1979), the court denied state action when tenants alleged 
procedural due process violations against landlords of a federally subsidized housing 
project. The only nexus indicia included zoning regulations, and reduced utility rates 
and taxes. These factors, the court held, did not come up to Fortin because the housing 
projects were privately owned and "the badge of 'public entity' cannot fairly be at­
tached to them." [d. at 511; see also Ponce v. Basketball Federation of Puerto Rico, 760 
F.2d 375, 382 n.5 (1st Cir. 1985) (denying state action where a private sporting organiza­
tion revoked a player's right to play because of his national origin, and distinguishing 
itself from Fortin by noting that the sporting organization did not take on a semi-official 
character in the public's eye because the government's accommodations were far less 
significant than they were in Fortin). 
268. See Yeo v. Town of Lexington, 131 F.3d 241, 254 & n.15 (1st Cir. 1997) (en 
banc), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2060 (1998). 
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role in the high school's identity-and the students need the public 
high school for these opportunities. That is, the public high school 
provides the framework within which students make editorial and 
advertising decisions.269 The public high school, in other words, 
"has elected to place its power, property and prestige behind the 
[challenged conduct]."27o In doing so, the students' editorial deci­
sions were sufficiently intertwined with the state. 
Judge Lynch, in her majority opinion, therefore, should have 
considered the combined weight of these factors and more carefully 
analyzed whether, taken together, they would suggest the students' 
decisions were fairly attributable to the state. Such an analysis 
should have occurred as it would have had the case involved race 
discrimination.271 Under the "Equal Consideration Approach," 
therefore, the court might have found state action.272 
CONCLUSION 
The First Circuit en banc decision in Yeo has too narrowly in­
269. Cf. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 622 (1991) (finding 
state action when a plaintiff in a civil case used a peremptory challenge to exclude a 
juror on the basis of his race, and noting in its analysis that the government had "cre­
ated the legal framework governing the [challenged] conduct" (citation omitted». 
270. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961). 
271. See Yeo, 131 F.3d at 254 n.15. 
272. The court in Yeo worried that finding state action would effectively "spell 
the end" to public school publications, since students could not report or editorialize 
without running afoul of the First Amendment's mandate of viewpoint neutrality. See 
id. at 258. (Stahl, J., concurring). But this worry is misplaced. The court could have 
avoided this consequence if it had ruled on the merits by analyzing the weight and 
scope of the student editors' First Amendment rights as editors, and balancing them 
against Douglas Yeo's claim to access to the publications. For example, in his concur­
ring opinion, Chief Judge Torruella appeared to have wanted to find state action and 
discuss the merits because he decided to write separately "to highlight an important 
issue that the majority fails to address-the absence of a public forum." Id. at 255 (Tor­
ruella, J., concurring). He argued that the students were not intending "to open a fo­
rum for all public discourse" and as such they were "permitted to filter out pure 
political speech." Id.; cf. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 
1633, 1644 (1998) (holding that a broadcaster's decision to exclude a political candidate 
from a state-owned public television broadcast's political debate "was a reasonable, 
viewpoint-neutral exercise of journalistic discretion consistent with the First Amend­
ment" (emphasis added». Such an analysis would have been more beneficial than the 
court's variable state action analysis which treated First Amendment rights as less im­
portant than rights of racial equality. In fact, the contrary may be true: First Amend­
ment rights may be more important since they constitute the groundwork for a 
democracy itself within which the value of racial equality is defended by public argu­
ments of law, politics and morality. See, e.g., Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147,161 
(1939) (noting that the First Amendment "lies at the foundation of free government by 
free men"). 
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terpreted the state action inquiry. In focusing on each nexus factor 
in isolation, the court, in essence, overlooked the forest while going 
tree to tree. The majority applied a narrow state action analysis 
under the assumption that state action analysis should vary with the 
type of constitutional violation alleged. As such, the majority ap­
plied a higher state action standard to Yeo's First Amendment com­
plaint than it would have if his complaint had been one of racial 
discrimination. 
Keying state action standards to the type of constitutional vio­
lations alleged, as the court did in Yeo, is problematic since this 
approach fails to impose judicial accountability to explain why 
some constitutional rights are ranked higher than others, and be­
cause it fails to sufficiently respect each constitutional claimant's 
fundamental right violation. This Note suggests that courts should 
apply the same state action standard to all fundamental rights, 
namely, by using the liberal totality approach currently employed 
by courts in racial discrimination cases. This approach promotes 
both a sufficient level of judicial accountability and equal respect 
for fundamental constitutional rights. As applied to Yeo, this Note 
concludes that state action should have been found since the major­
ity would have reached a finding of state action had it used the 
totality approach. Yeo, therefore, should have had his day in court. 
Rory B. Weiner 
